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INCHOATE CRIMES REVISITED: A BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
Manuel A. Utset *
INTRODUCTION
Inchoate liability is triggered before an offender has completed
the underlying offense. An offender is liable for attempting the
underlying offense once he has taken substantial steps toward
the commission of the offense:' for solicitation, once he has solic-
ited another to commit the underlying offense; for conspiracy,
once he has agreed to engage in the underlying offense; for bur-
glary, once he has entered the premises, intending, once inside, to
commit an underlying offense. Inchoate crimes create the poten-
tial that individuals will be punished not due to their 'bad' ac-
tions, but for what they say,2 the company that they keep,' or the
false testimony of individuals out to settle a score.4 Why does so-
ciety criminalize conduct that, by itself, does not harm others?
Both retributivist and consequentialist theories of criminal liabil-
ity have struggled to give a sufficiently robust normative justifi-
cation for inchoate offenses.
From a retributivist perspective, an offender is punished be-
cause his actions have harmed others, and thus deserve to be
• Charles W. Ehrhardt Professor, Florida State University College of Law; J.D.,
1987, University of Michigan; B.S., 1984, Georgetown University.
1. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) ("[attempts are punished where wrongdoer's
actions constitute] a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his
commission of the crime").
2. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 11.1(c), at 196-98 (2003)
(describing problems that can arise with the types of statements that can trigger criminal
solicitation).
3. For example, conspiracy liability has been used to deter group activities, such as
strikes, that the government saw as threatening. See Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspir-
acy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 393, 407-08 (1922) (summarizing case law on prosecution of unions
and strikes).
4. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.1(b), at 193 (discussing the potential for false
charges in the context of criminal solicitation).
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punished.' A person who shoots at another and misses does not
directly harm the intended victim and does not deserve to be pun-
ished.6 A consequentialist is no better off. Under the consequen-
tialist (and thus the law and economics) approach, a lawmaker
should set expected sanctions equal to the harm produced by the
illegal behavior. If the inchoate crime by itself creates no harm, it
should not be punished.
This article develops a general behavioral theory of criminal
misconduct and uses this theory to provide new justifications for
the existence of inchoate offenses and for why they are punished
less severely than the underlying offense.
Criminal misconduct has four general characteristics that are
important for understanding inchoate offenses. First, whenever
an offender engages in misconduct, he is in essence making a se-
ries of intertemporal decisions. An offender must plan and exe-
cute the crime, and will have to take steps to avoid detection after
the fact. Additionally, by necessity, there is always a temporal
gap between the time that an offender commits a crime and the
time when society can try to punish him. Second, criminal mis-
conduct involves great amount of uncertainty, both from the of-
fender's and society's perspective. Offenders and law enforcement
spend a large amount of time and effort to achieve secrecy and
anonymity; one would thus expect that, compared to other areas
of the law, the world of crime and punishment involves greater
levels of informational asymmetry and strategic uses of infor-
mation. Third, crimes are by nature irreversible: Once an offend-
er has triggered criminal liability, he cannot undo his deed.
Fourth, as a general matter offenders will have the ability to
choose when they will commit a crime.
These four factors, taken together, would lead rational offend-
ers to take advantage of the 'real option' involved: Where there is
a large amount of uncertainty and actions, once taken, are irre-
versible, it pays to wait until the right time-until one has re-
solved a sufficient amount of the attendant uncertainty to lead to
5. See Leo Zaibert, The Moralist Strikes Back, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 139, 145 (2011)
(describing how the punishment of the deserving legitimizes the system).
6. See Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful
One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791, 795 (2000) (describing difficulty for retributivist in dealing with
inchoate offenses).
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the best possible decision to either commit a crime or obey the
law.
Uncertainty and the irreversible nature of misconduct will
have an additional effect: An offender will have an incentive to
invest in planning, executing, and covering up his illegal activi-
ties. These transaction costs of crimes impose immediate costs on
offenders, costs which have been overlooked by the standard law
and economics account of deterrence but which play an important
role in a world in which offenders exhibit rationality shortcom-
ings. The behavioral theory of criminal misconduct developed in
this article focuses on three principal obstacles to perfectly ra-
tional behavior.
First, the uncertainty and strategically managed informational
asymmetries involved in the relationship between offenders and
law enforcement makes criminal misconduct a relatively complex
undertaking. Complexity makes information less transparent and
increases the likelihood that at least part of it will be obscured
from decision-makers. All other things being equal, offenders will
pay greater attention to the more salient aspects of the crime and
may fail to fully attend to more complex or hidden pieces of in-
formation. As this level of inattention increases, so does the like-
lihood that offenders will commit crimes that they would have
avoided but for their inattention.
Second, offenders, like most individuals, routinely exhibit a
preference for immediate gratification. Offenders with even rela-
tively small levels of present-bias who are sufficiently overopti-
mistic about their future willpower can commit non-worthwhile
crimes. That is, they will have a long-term preference to obey the
law which they will override when they are presented with the
prospect of grabbing the immediate rewards from misconduct.
This sort of time-inconsistent misconduct can lead to welfare
losses for offenders and for the third parties harmed by their er-
ratic behavior.
Third, when making intertemporal decisions, offenders will
have to predict their future tastes and preferences. There is a
large empirical literature finding that people routinely mispredict
the extent to which their preferences may change over time. This
is due to a projection bias: When trying to predict their future
tastes and preferences, people will give undue weight to their
current tastes and preferences. Even though individuals know
120720131
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that they may be engaged in this sort of distortion, they still un-
derappreciate the full extent of their projection bias. The projec-
tion bias can lead offenders to commit non-worthwhile crimes.
For example, offenders who are in a hot psychological state may
underappreciate the extent to which their preferences will change
after the crime, when they are back in a cold psychological state;
they may, moreover, underappreciate the full disutility that they
will experience if they are apprehended, convicted, and punished.
After developing this general behavioral theory of criminal
misconduct, this article shows how it helps us get a better under-
standing of inchoate offenses. Inchoate offenses increase the
overall complexity of planning and executing the underlying of-
fense. A crime's complexity will increase with the number of fac-
tors that an offender must take into account in order to succeed
with his underlying goal-executing the underlying offense and
escaping detection. As a general matter, the greater the complexi-
ty involved the lower the likelihood that an offender will commit
the crime successfully and avoid detection. The deterrence effect
of inchoate offenses, therefore, is greater than that predicted by
the standard economic account, given the way that they interact
with complexity and the bounded rationality and potential inat-
tention of offenders.
Additionally, inchoate crimes act as a commitment device to
help deter time inconsistent ("TI") misconduct. Attempts, con-
spiracy, and solicitation are part of an interconnected duo of
crimes (the inchoate offense and the underlying crime). Moreover,
they punish behavior that does not provide offenders with an
immediate return (it is the underlying crime that may provide an
offender with an immediate reward).7 By imposing liability before
the offender commits the underlying crime, and before he can
reap its rewards, inchoate crimes force offenders to precommit to
the underlying crime ahead of time. An offender who will engage
in TI misconduct vis-A-vis the underlying crime, if there is no in-
choate liability, may be effectively deterred by the additional pun-
ishment provided by attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation liability.
More specifically, I show that sophisticated TI offenders-those
who accurately predict their future self-control problems-will be
effectively deterred by inchoate liability, even when this liability
7. See infra Section III.C (describing this type of strategy for deterring TI offenders).
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is much lower than that for the underlying offense. Second, once
offenders have triggered an inchoate offense, they will have to in-
cur immediate costs to avoid being apprehended before they are
able to complete the underlying offense. I show that naive TI of-
fenders-those who incorrectly believe that they will have perfect
self-control-will have an incentive to repeatedly procrastinate
making these prophylactic investments; this will either lead them
never to trigger the inchoate offense or will increase the likeli-
hood that they will be arrested before engaging in TI misconduct.
In either case, naive offenders are made better off by the exist-
ence of the inchoate offense. For example, as long as the punish-
ment for the inchoate offense is sufficiently lower than that for
the underlying offense, TI offenders will be better off if they are
prevented from engaging in a non-worthwhile underlying offense.
Finally, and for similar reasons, offenders who commit non-
worthwhile crimes due to the projection bias would be better off if
they are stopped before they commit the underlying offense; in-
choate offenses can thus act as a second-best solution for these of-
fenders.
Section I provides a general overview of inchoate offenses. It
also summarizes the standard law and economic approach to
criminal misconduct and explains the general difficulty it faces in
trying to explain why inchoate offenses exist and why they are
punished less harshly than the underlying offense. Section II de-
velops the behavioral theory of criminal misconduct. Section III
shows how this theory helps explain aspects of inchoate offenses
that cannot be fully explained by the standard economic ap-
proach.
I. INCHOATE CRIMES: BACKGROUND
The criminal law imposes liability on those whose actions cause
a harm if the offender, at the time of acting, has the requisite
culpable state of mind.' Sometimes, however, an offender may act
with the requisite culpable state of mind but fail to cause a harm.
For example, Bob points a gun at Mary, shoots, but misses. An of-
fender may act in a manner that reveals an intent to harm, but
be stopped short by the police, the victim, or his own conscience.
For example, suppose that Bob points a gun at Mary, but before
8. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 296 (1986).
2013] 1209
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he can shoot, the police arrest him, or Mary wrestles the gun from
him, or he has second thoughts about shooting Mary, re-holsters
the gun, and walks away. In both of these cases, Bob's actions
trigger liability for criminal attempt' even though they failed to
harm Mary. Similarly, if Bob wanted Mary dead, but, for whatev-
er reason, he did not want to do the deed himself, he may ask
Frank to kill Mary on his behalf. The very act of asking Frank to
commit a crime opens Bob to a charge of criminal solicitation."0 If
Bob decides to shoot Mary himself but believes that he is most
likely to avoid detection if he has Frank act as a lookout, and
Frank agrees to join in this scheme to kill Mary, they both will
trigger liability for conspiracy at the point that they agree to act
jointly."
Because criminal convictions can lead to imprisonment, stigma,
and a continuing impact on the convict after he has served his
sentence, the criminal law provides, at least in theory, clear
statements of the types of events that will trigger liability. Where
there is ambiguity or vagueness, courts will interpret the law
narrowly.'2 Modern criminal law, therefore, is codified in statutes
which, compared to the judge-made rules, allow for clearer speci-
fication, greater constancy, and a higher level of invariance in
their interpretation and application." For example, substantive
crimes, such as murder, rape, and robbery, have clear triggering
conditions, and the criminal events themselves last for relatively
short periods. 4 Inchoate crimes, on the other hand, tend to have
less clearly defined triggering conditions and can last for longer
periods of time. In other words, while the underlying offense may
occur within a relatively small time period, the planning of the
underlying offense will often take much longer, and at some point
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (2001) (defining criminal attempt).
10. See id. § 5.02 (defining criminal solicitation).
11. See id. § 5.03 (defining criminal conspiracy).
12. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975) (noting that criminal law must give ade-
quate warning of what is prohibited); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
170-71 (1972) (striking down an ordinance for giving too much discretion to police in its
application).
13. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE
WORLD 1-11, 75-83 (2001) (arguing that, of the various ways of identifying the objectivity
of something, a fundamental truth is that an objective fact remains invariant in the face of
well-defined, meaningful transformations).
14. An individual may also commit the same crime repeatedly over a short period of
time, such as repeated rape or a murder spree.
[Vol. 47:12051210
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during this planning phase, an offender may trigger one of the in-
choate offenses.
A. Solicitation
An offender triggers liability for solicitation to commit a crime
"if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he
commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in
specific conduct that would constitute such a crime." 5 An offender
may commit the crime himself or delegate its execution to a sec-
ond party. A rational offender will delegate the commission of a
crime whenever he determines that the expected benefits are
greater than the aggregate expected cost from delegation. Sup-
pose that A wants to break into B's house and steal a valuable Pi-
casso painting. If A carries out the crime alone, he will keep all of
the proceeds and bear the expected cost from the burglary-the
planning, execution, and cover-up costs, as well as the expected
sanctions for stealing the Picasso. A, however, may decide that he
prefers to delegate the criminal task to C. He may do so because
he believes that C is a more efficient thief, in the sense that he
can accomplish the crime at a lower expected cost-including the
likelihood of being detected. A may also decide to delegate be-
cause he does not want to bear the direct and salient disutility
from committing the crime. Direct involvement is more likely to
trigger disutility from violating moral strictures, for example.16
Suppose that A approaches C and solicits him to steal the Picas-
so. If C agrees to do so, then A and C will become co-
conspirators;17 if C rejects A's offer, then C escapes liability, but A
triggers the inchoate offense of solicitation.
Why is solicitation a crime? One reason is to provide a disin-
centive for A to approach third parties to encourage them to act
as his agent in committing a crime. Second, by turning solicita-
tion into a criminal event, law enforcement is able to intervene
earlier in the process and detect and prevent potential crimes.
Third, a party who solicits another to commit a crime has re-
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (2001) (defining criminal solicitation and also defin-
ing solicitation to mean an act that would constitute an attempt or would trigger complici-
ty liability).
16. Individuals are unlikely to fully incorporate the full magnitude of hidden costs.
See Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 112 (2009).
17. See infra Section I.C.
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vealed an intention to see that crime committed. However, it is
possible to argue that the fact that A has solicited C means that A
is unlikely to commit the crime himself or that he believes that he
does not have the requisite skill. Nonetheless, it is plausible that
if A is rejected by C, he may still approach D, and, if need be, E
and F, to commit the crime. Finally, solicitations create a number
of negative externalities and, thus, social costs. First, some indi-
viduals who had no intention of committing a crime and would
have obeyed the law may be convinced to engage in criminal mis-
conduct. Second, if the person solicited is not a repeat player in
committing crimes and, thus, is unfamiliar with the ins and outs
of criminal law, he may not know what to do and may experience
disutility if he does nothing (he may believe that doing nothing
violates the law)," or he may fear if he reports it to the authori-
ties, he will be persuaded or required to help the authorities (if,
for example he is called as a witness). Third, if the person solicit-
ed is a repeat criminal and under probation, the very act of being
solicited may trigger some liability or additional costs-he may
violate probation if he is deemed to be consorting with known
criminals or if he fails to report it or if he reports it and it leads to
greater scrutiny from his probation officers.
B. Attempt
An individual will trigger inchoate liability for criminal at-
tempt whenever he has taken substantial steps toward the com-
mission of the underlying crime. 9 If A shoots at B with the intent
of killing her but misses, he is chargeable for attempted murder.2 °
If it turns out that who A thought was B was really a "dummy"
18. In some instances, such as when a patient tells a therapist that he intends to
commit a crime, the therapist may be required to report this to the authorities. See Tara-
soff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976); Timothy E. Gammon &
John K. Hulston, The Duty of Mental Health Care Providers to Restrain Their Patients or
Warn Third Parties, 60 Mo. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (1995). In general, however, there is no
duty to report crimes. See, e.g., Matthew R. Hall, Note, An Emerging Duty to Report Crim-
inal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J.
643, 643-445 (1996) (discussing the general historic rule that there is no duty to report
crimes).
19. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (2001) ("[Criminal attempt is] an act or omis-
sion constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in [the of-
fender's] commission of the crime.").
20. See id. § 5.01(1)(b) (including cases in which the action of omission is done with
belief that "without further conduct on his part" it would result in crime).
1212 [Vol. 47:1205
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that looked like B, A nonetheless triggers attempt liability.21 Fi-
nally, if A raises his rifle and takes aim at B, but the police inter-
vene in the nick of time, before he has fired, A is once again
chargeable for attempt, given that aiming the rifle at B is suffi-
cient to constitute a substantial step.2
Why criminalize attempts? The arguments are similar to those
for making solicitation a crime. First, when A attempts to murder
B and misses, is mistaken about whom he is shooting at, or is
stopped before he is able to complete the underlying crime, he has
indicated an intention and predisposition to commit that crime.
Even though he failed this time around, he may attempt the
crime again. Second, as we have seen, a criminal event occurs in a
very small window of time-it may take only seconds for A to aim
the rifle and shoot at B. On the other hand, A will spend more
time preparing for the crime: Purchasing the weapon, taking it
with him in preparation for shooting B, lying in wait, or engaging
in other preparatory steps aimed at increasing the likelihood of
success. Attempt liability allows the police to intervene during
this earlier, larger window. This allows the police to stop a crime
before it has reached a point of no return, when the harm has
been unleashed. Moreover, even if the police were able to stop A
right before he has fired the weapon-giving them a larger win-
dow of time to intervene and arrest A for attempt makes sense
from the perspective of coordination-a crime can be stopped only
if the police and the perpetrator are in the same place at the same
time, during a period in which the police have the legal authority
to stop the offender from continuing.
C. Conspiracy
Conspiracy liability is triggered whenever two or more individ-
uals agree to engage in criminal conduct or aid in the commission
of a crime.23 Unlike attempts, there is no need for conspirators to
21. See id. § 5.01(1)(a) (including cases in which offender believes that his actions
would result in crime but is mistaken).
22. See id. § 5.01(1)(c) (including cases in which offender is interrupted in the criminal
act and cannot complete it).
23. See id. § 5.03 ("[Conspiracy liability is triggered when a person agrees with anoth-
er to] engage in conduct that constitutes [a] crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit
such crime [or] agrees to aid [another] in the planning or commission of such crime or an
attempt or solicitation to commit such a crime."); see also Pettibone v. United States, 148
U.S. 197, 203 (1893) ("Conspiracy is ... a combination of two or more persons, by concert-
2013] 1213
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take substantial steps toward the commission of the underlying
21
crime; all that is needed is for them to reach an agreement.
Moreover, while a wrongdoer may only be charged for an attempt
or the actual offense, 21 co-conspirators can be charged and con-
victed for being part of the conspiracy, as well as for any offense
committed by any of the conspirators. 26 Finally, the law provides
much greater leeway for a single wrongdoer to abandon an at-
tempt than for a co-conspirator to withdraw from a conspiracy.27
Why are conspiracies punished and why are co-conspirators
treated more harshly than someone charged with an attempt?
The standard justification is that group misconduct poses a
greater threat to society than do the actions of lone criminals.28
Some crimes, the argument goes, can be carried out more effi-
ciently if two or more individuals join forces, due to the division of
labor.29
D. Standard Economic Model of Criminal Misconduct
The standard law and economics model of criminal miscon-
duct"° assumes that rational offenders will engage in criminal
ed action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself crim-
inal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means....").
24. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03. This is the case in common law conspiracies; how-
ever, some conspiracy statutes require some overt action toward commission of the under-
lying crime. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.20 (Consol. 1998).
25. See LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.5(c), at 250-51 (describing the merger rule for
criminal attempt).
26. See Pinkerton v. United States 328 U.S. 640, 643-44, 646-47 (1946) (holding a
defendant can be convicted for both conspiracy and the underlying offense); LAFAVE, supra
note 2, § 12.2(b), at 271-75.
27. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 12.4(b), at 308-11 (discussing restrictions on withdrawing
from conspiracies).
28. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that group misconduct is more dangerous given the "strength, opportunities
and resources" of a group of offenders); Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE
L.J. 1307, 1339 (2003) (providing cognitive psychology explanations for the dangerousness
of conspiratorial groups).
29. See, e.g., Shachar Eldar, Punishing Organized Crime Leaders for the Crimes of
their Subordinates, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 183, 192-93 (2010) (discussing division of labor
within criminal groups).
30. The standard utilitarian approach to criminal behavior and deterrence is based on
the principles of punishment proposed by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late
eighteenth century. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158-59 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970)
(1789). Bentham's basic insights were formalized by economist Gary Becker and further
elaborated by law and economics scholars. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 4 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW] (recognizing Beck-
[Vol. 47:12051214
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misconduct whenever the expected benefits exceed the expected
sanctions." The benefits can be either tangible or intangible in
nature.32 It is usually assumed that the offender will know what
they are, but to the extent that he is uncertain, he will discount
the gross benefits to account for this uncertainty. For example, a
bank robber may be uncertain about how much money is in the
bank vault and a mugger, about the contents of a victim's wallet."
Committing a crime exposes the offender to fines and imprison-
ment, as well as informal sanctions, such as shaming, ostracism,
and loss of reputation.34 Since not all criminal misconduct will be
detected and punished, potential wrongdoers will discount crimi-
nal sanctions to account for the probability that they will escape
detection. 5 Society can increase expected sanctions by increasing
the magnitude of the penalty or the probability of detection,
which would require society to spend more on law enforcement.
er's work as fundamental to the application of economic reasoning to a broad range of legal
questions); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 191-95 (1968) (incorporating Bentham's ideas into a discussion regarding the
optimal amount of criminal sanctions); Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law En-
forcement, 11 J. ECON. SuRv. 267, 267-69 (1997) (acknowledging Becker in a discussion of
the optimal law enforcement model); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1193-94 (1985) [hereinafter ECONOMIC THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW] (arguing that Becker's theory can be extended to various areas of sub-
stantive criminal law).
31. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, supra note 30, at 219-20 (stating that the
economic approach to criminal law assumes that offenders are rational actors who commit
crimes when the expected benefits exceed expected costs and respond to changes in the
magnitude of criminal sanctions and the probability of detection and prosecution); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,
38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 47 (2000) (suggesting that a person will violate the law if and
only if the expected utility from doing so, taking into account the expected benefits and
sanctions, exceeds the utility that he would get from obeying the law).
32. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, supra note 30, at 219 ("[The benefits from
criminal misconduct include] various tangible (in the case of crimes of pecuniary gain) or
intangible (in the case of so-called crimes of passion) satisfactions from the criminal act.").
33. See James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359, 375
(1992) (finding that criminals consistently miscalculate the net expected benefits of com-
mitting crimes). Throughout the article, I refer to '"benefits" instead of expected benefits,
but the general conclusions will not change if we allow for expected benefits. The principal
difference is that a TI offender who mispredicts the actual benefits from future misconduct
may reach different conclusions regarding the need to adopt commitment devices.
34. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 637-47 (1996) (discussing the role of shaming in deterring criminal behavior and ef-
fecting other potential goals of punishment).
35. If the monetary fine for speeding is $200 and a person believes that the probability
that she will be caught is 10%, the expected sanction is $20. See STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 503-04 (2004) (noting that, for deterrence
purposes, an offender's belief about the probability of detection is more important than the
actual probability).
2013] 1215
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The standard model takes a utilitarian social welfare maximiz-
ing approach in which the goal is to cause an offender to internal-
ize the harm produced by his misconduct at the minimum cost to
society.36 It therefore focuses primarily on the question of deter-
mining the harm produced by misconduct, choosing the magni-
tude and type" of criminal sanctions so that offenders are proper-
ly deterred,8 and identifying ways in which society can minimize
enforcement costs." Finally, and importantly for our purposes,
the model implicitly assumes that offenders have time-consistent
("TC") preferences. It does so by either using an exponential dis-
count function or, more commonly, assuming that an offender's
impatience does not play a material role in his decisionmaking
40process.
E. The Conceptual Problems with Inchoate Offenses
One economic rationale for punishing attempts is that punish-
ment increases the expected sanctions from the underlying crime
36. See Becker, supra note 30, at 180-81 (describing the goal of minimizing the social
costs of crimes).
37. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Impris-
onment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 89-90 (1984) (discussing various ways of trading off mone-
tary fines and prison terms).
38. As a general matter, suppose that an offense produces a harm, h, and the proba-
bility of detection is p. When the sanction, s, is discounted by p - p * s-and if we set p *
s = h, then the optimal sanction is reached by multiplying the harm by the probability
multiplier 11p. Therefore, the optimal sanction is hip. SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 482 (dis-
cussing underdeterrence when offenders do not have sufficient levels of wealth to pay fines
necessary to properly deter them).
39. If the expected harm of an offense is $1000 and offenders can afford up to a
$100,000 fine, the probability of detection should be 1% and the actual fine $100,000. As-
suming that the administrative costs of fres do not increase with the level of the fine
(which will not always be the case because offenders facing higher fines may attempt to
hide assets), any investment in enforcement that increases the probability of detection
above 1% would be wasteful. This was one of the important insights in Gary Becker's work
on optimal criminal deterrence. See Becker, supra note 30, at 190-93 (describing the
trade-off between the magnitude of sanctions and enforcement expenditures to increase
probability of detection); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanc-
tions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1992) (describing the optimal trade-off between higher sanctions
and enforcement costs when offenders are imperfectly informed on the probability of de-
tection).
40. Long-term discounting is sometimes reintroduced when discussing imprisonment.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Impris-
onment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-6 (1999) (discussing the role
of exponential discounting in calculating the overall disutility of prison sentences when
there are variations among populations regarding their level of long-term discounting-for
example, some offenders are risk neutral while others are risk averse).
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without increasing the actual sanctions.1 Punishing wrongdoers
whether or not the underlying crime succeeds has the effect of in-
creasing the probability that criminal sanctions will be imposed.
Attempts, however, are punished less severely than the underly-
ing crime. If punishing attempts allows society to increase ex-
pected sanctions in an efficient manner, why not punish attempts
as severely as the underlying crime?42 Two principal economic jus-
tifications have been offered. The first justification is based on
fairness concerns: A person who shoots into a bed believing that
someone is asleep should be punished, even though no one was in
the bed, since the person has exhibited a level of dangerousness
that requires deterrence. It does not follow that he should be pun-
ished to the same extent as if he had actually succeeded in killing
the intended target. 3 The second justification is based on the con-
cept of marginal deterrence. 4 An offender who has taken substan-
tial steps and triggered inchoate liability is unlikely to change his
mind and forego committing the underlying offense if the penalty
for attempt is the same as that for the underlying offense."
II. A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT
This Section develops a general model of criminal misconduct
based on the certain rationality shortcomings documented in the
behavior economics literature on (1) bounded rationality and lim-
ited attention, (2) time-inconsistent preferences and the propensi-
ty of individuals to procrastinate in certain contexts and overcon-
41. For a discussion on the general constraints on increasing the actual magnitude of
sanctions, see infra Section III.C.
42. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal At-
tempts: A Victim-Centered Approach, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 332-36 (1996) (summarizing
various approaches used by deterrence proponents to justify having lower sanctions for
attempts); Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempt, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
435, 435, 446-56 (1990) (describing criminal attempt as inchoate crime triggered even
though no harm is produced and setting forth a model of optimal deterrence aimed at jus-
tifying punishment attempts, and doing so with lower expected sanctions than for the un-
derlying offense).
43. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, supra note 30, at 299-30 (setting forth ex-
amples and rationale).
44. Society has an interest in effecting marginal deterrence: if a criminal who rapes
someone will receive the same punishment for rape and murder, he will have no reason
not to murder the person he rapes, since it will reduce the probability that he will be iden-
tified as the perpetrator. See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 518-19 (discussing marginal de-
terrence).
45. See ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, supra note 30, at 229 (providing marginal
deterrence explanation for lower sanctions).
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sume (or act too quickly) in other contexts, and (3) projection bias
that leads individuals to mispredict their future tastes and, thus,
their future preferences.
A. Four General Characteristics of Criminal Misconduct
This Section identifies four characteristics of criminal miscon-
duct that play an important role in offenders' reactions to poten-
tial sanctions, decisions about whether to commit a crime, and
the optimal time to engage in misconduct
1. Intertemporal Nature of Criminal Misconduct
In order to plan, execute, and cover-up a crime, an offender will
have to make a series of intertemporal decisions, where the payoff
of an intertemporal decision-both costs and benefits-
materialize over time. In other words, an offender's decision in
one period can affect his welfare in that period and in one or more
future periods." A rational offender will choose his course of crim-
inal misconduct so as to maximize his intertemporal utility (the
sum of his current and future well-being),47 taking into account
how he expects to act in the future.48 In making these inter-
temporal decisions, an offender will take into account the 'instan-
taneous utility' that he expects to receive in the current period
and all relevant future periods. This utility can be positive, such
as the benefits from committing a crime, or negative, such as the
costs of planning, executing, and covering up a crime, the
46. Intertemporal decisions are those that have deferred consequences; they involve
the general problem of how to choose between outcomes that are distributed over time. See
George F. Loewenstein & Draien Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 565, 565 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);
George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 181, 181 (1989) ("[I]ntertemporal choices [are] decisions in which the timing of
costs and benefits are spread out over time."). For a general discussion of various roles
played by time in decision-making, see Dan Ariely & Dan Zakay, A Timely Account of the
Role of Duration in Decision Making, 108 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 187 (2001).
47. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q. J.
ECON. 121, 128 (2001) [hereinafter Choice and Procrastination] (setting up a general
model where people act with reasonable beliefs about future actions and choose current
actions to maximize preferences in light of those beliefs).
48. Under the standard intertemporal model, individuals are assumed to use an inter-
temporal utility function that captures the sum of their utility over their whole life. See
Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 315, 316-17 (2009) (discussing general model and its limitations).
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immediate disutility if he is arrested, and the punishment he will
receive if he is convicted.
2. Uncertainty as to Expected Payoffs
At the time an offender commits a crime, he will be uncertain
about the expected payoffs of the crime. The offender will be un-
certain about the likelihood that he will be caught, convicted, and
punished. This uncertainty, in turn, will depend both on factors
within his control and unforeseen contingencies. For example, the
victim may be an undercover police officer or a homeowner with
an elaborate alarm system and a gun on her night table; there
may or may not be witnesses, surveillance cameras, or other
means of capturing and preserving other characteristics of an of-
fender that can later be used to identify and convict him. If an of-
fender has accomplices, he will have to take into account the like-
lihood that they will be caught and agree to cooperate with the
police. An offender may also be uncertain about the magnitude of
the punishment that he will face if caught, which will depend on
the intricacies of sentencing guidelines or norms and whether the
crime results in injuries, death, or collateral damage to property.
Finally, an offender may be uncertain about the expected benefits
from committing a crime. For example, a bank robber may be un-
certain about how much money is in the bank vault, a mugger,
about the contents of a victim's wallet, and a murderer, about the
utility that he will receive from seeing the victim dead.49
3. Irreversibility of Crimes
Once an offender has taken all the requisite steps to trigger
criminal liability, he cannot undo his crime." For example, an of-
fender who robs a bank and returns a minute later to return the
cash is still subject to liability. An offender who has committed a
crime and discovered after the fact that it was a bad idea may try
to reduce some of the losses from having made a bad decision: He
may turn himself in, enter into a plea bargain, offer an excuse,
provide restitution, or apologize to the victims. Alternatively, the
49. See Wilson & Abrahamse, supra note 33, at 367-68, 375 (finding that criminals
consistently miscalculate the net expected benefits of committing crimes).
50. Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.1(d), at 198-201 (discussing that once criminal lia-
bility for solicitation is triggered, the offender is typically unable to undo this liability by
simply renouncing the crime).
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offender may expend additional resources trying to cover up the
crime. In choosing between these two general mitigation strate-
gies, a rational offender will choose the one that will minimize the
expected loss from the crime, taking into account that attempts to
cover-up the crime may trigger additional liability. One of the dif-
ficult conceptual issues surrounding inchoate crimes involves the
ability of an offender to renounce the inchoate offense ex post and
the consequences of such a change of heart.
4. Ability to Choose Optimal Timing for Committing a Crime
In most instances, an offender has flexibility in choosing when
to commit a crime; while there are crimes of opportunity that are
a 'now-or-never' proposition, most crimes do not have such strict
time constraints. In fact, it is difficult to think of many crimes in
which an offender has such constraints, at least if one allows for
offenders who want to achieve a particular goal and can achieve
that goal through multiple means. If Andrew wants the crime to
yield $100, he can rob a bank, mug a pedestrian, or burglarize a
home. He will have n banks, n pedestrians, and n homes to choose
from-he does not have to settle for the first one that comes
along. Moreover, each of these possible targets may provide him
with different time windows. A bank, for example, is closed dur-
ing certain hours, and a home is likely to be empty during the day
or when the occupants are traveling. More generally, an offender
will choose which crime to commit and the optimal time to follow
through with the planned misconduct so as to maximize his inter-
temporal utility.
B. Consequences of These Four Characteristics of Criminal
Misconduct
Given the uncertainty about the payoffs from criminal miscon-
duct, the irreversibility of criminal liability, and an offender's
general ability to decide when, if at all, to commit a crime, one
would expect that rational offenders make certain investments to
plan, execute, and cover up their crimes and to trigger criminal
liability only when they are sufficiently certain of the conse-
quences that will flow from their misconduct. More specifically, in
making a decision at time t, an offender will take into account the
instantaneous utility, if any, that she will receive immediately, u,
and the effects of her current decision on her, t + 1, instantaneous
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utility, u'. In making this decision, the offender will need to pre-
dict his future utility, which will depend on the state of the world
that arises, st 1, and the payoffs, x,.,, given that state of the world.
In period t, therefore, the offender will have a subjective probabil-
ity assessment of which state of the world may arise, and a sense
of how his instantaneous utility can vary, under the various pos-
sible states of the world. More precisely, given n possible states of
the world, the offender will have a probability distribution, p(s),
over those n states. For example, a potential bank robber may be-
lieve that there is a 0.5 probability that the robbery will yield
$50,000 and a 0.5 probability that it will yield $10,000, for an ex-
pected benefit of [(0.5 x $30,000) + (0.5 x $1000)] = $15,500. He
may also believe that the gross sanctions for bank robbery are
(translating for the sake of simplicity the disutility from impris-
onment into a dollar amount) [(0.25 x $200,000) + (0.25 x
$100,000) + (0.5 x $10,000) = $50,000 + $25,000 + $5000 =
$80,000. Finally, the offender may believe that he has a 0.9 prob-
ability of getting away with the crime and a 0.1 probability of be-
ing apprehended and punished. The offender will thus conclude
that the expected benefits of $15,500 are greater than the ex-
pected sanctions of ($80,000 x 0.1) = $8000."' It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that a rational offender will also conclude
that he should rob the bank immediately.
1. Real Options: The Value of Waiting to Commit Crimes
Given the irreversibility of criminal liability, the offender may
conclude that it is worthwhile to wait and acquire additional in-
formation about the amount of money in the bank, the gross sanc-
tions, and the likelihood that the police will identify him as the
bank robber and arrest him. For example, suppose that, by wait-
ing and acquiring more information about the bank, the offender
will know whether the bank is of the type that will have $30,000
or $1000 in cash. The offender now has an option value that he
needs to incorporate into his decision calculus: If he learns that
this type of bank keeps only $1000 in cash then he will decide not
to rob it, given the expected sanctions of $8000. So even though,
under the standard account, the offender would rob the bank im-
51. 1 will assume throughout this article that the offender is risk neutral; an offender
who is risk averse would add an additional premium to the disutility associated with the
variance around these expected values.
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mediately as long as the costs of delaying the bank robbery are
not too great, the offender would make use of this real option em-
bedded in the bank robbery decision.52 In other words, one can
view the decision to rob a bank as having an exercise price that is
equal to the expected sanctions triggered by the crime and, that
by paying that exercise price, the bank robber receives an asset
equal to the proceeds from the robbery. At time t, robbing the
bank has a positive net present value of $7500. But at time t + 1,
the bank robber will have more accurate information and will de-
cide to exercise the option only if the bank is of the $30,000 type.
While I will not develop the argument further in this article, it
should be noted that one justification for imposing inchoate liabil-
ity on offenders is to make them pay for this option to delay, par-
ticularly when the information acquired by the offender allows
them to make more accurate decisions at the expense of society. 3
2. Discounting to Account for Impatience
In deciding whether a crime is worthwhile and its optimal tim-
ing, an offender will also take into account his general impa-
tience; that is, as a general matter, his preference to receive re-
wards earlier and defer costs until future periods. 4 Economists
model this impatience using an exponential discount function in
which the discount factor, 6, captures how much a person dis-
counts a one-period delay in receiving a reward or incurring a
cost. An offender who discounts the future using an exponential
discount function will, at time t, give full weight to an immediate
payoff; he will, in addition, discount a period t + 1 payoff by 6, a
period t + 2 payoff by 82, a period t + 3 payoff by 6', and so on-
where 5, is set to less than 1. Suppose that an offender discounts
a one-period delay using a discount factor, 6 = 0.5. A time t, he
52. Cf. AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
27-41 (1994) (developing real option analysis for a plant investment project, and con-
trasting it with standard net present value approach to making investment decisions).
53. See Manuel A. Utset, Inchoate Liability: A Real Options Approach (Mar. 28, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
54. A person whose discount factor is 1 does not discount delayed payoffs, and the
closer a person's discount factor gets to 0, the greater the amount that he discounts for a
one-period delay in receiving a payoff. For a general discussion of time discounting, see
Frederick et al., Time Discounting: A Critical Review, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 162, 167 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004). A number of explanations have
been offered for this general impatience. See, e.g., Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 PHIL.
REV. 3 (1971) (arguing that individuals discount future payoffs because of changes in iden-
tity over time-i.e., a diminution of the connection between our present and future selves).
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would value $1000 received immediately at its full value, and
would value delayed $1000 payoffs in periods t + 1, t + 2, and t +
3, respectively, at: $1000 x 0.5 = $500; $1000 x 0.25 = $250; and
$1000 x 0.125 = $125.
3. Investing in Planning, Executing, and Covering Up Criminal
Misconduct
Given the uncertainty and irreversibility of criminal miscon-
duct and an offender's ability to time his misconduct, one would
expect a rational offender to invest time and money to plan, exe-
cute, and cover-up his crimes. These transaction costs of criminal
misconduct are best labeled as investments since they require an
offender to incur immediate costs at time t in order to produce de-
layed rewards at time t + 1. As a general matter, an individual
will make an investment at time t if the immediate costs are less
than the delayed future payoffs, properly discounted to take into
account the uncertainty regarding the delayed payoffs and to ac-
count for the offender's impatience." An offender will make in-
vestments during the planning phase, the actual execution of the
crime, and afterwards to cover-up the crime and avoid being iden-
tified, apprehended, and convicted."
a. Investments During the Planning Phase
Planning a crime requires an offender to incur immediate costs,
an investment that he will make with the expectation that they
will produce a net positive return in the future, when he executes
the underlying offense. Rational offenders will acquire infor-
mation and make other up-front investments in order to make a
better decision about a potential crime. They will incur a cost at
time t, to search for, acquire, and process information 7 in order to
55. This long-term impatience, modeled in the usual fashion, using an exponential
function, includes not just psychological based impatience, but also the general time value
of money-which captures the return from investing instead in a risk free asset, at the
market risk-free return.
56. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1352-
60 (2006) (discussing empirical evidence on avoidance costs incurred by offenders).
57. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, in COLLECTED
PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 136, 138-40 (1984) (dis-
cussing the role of information in reducing uncertainty and its value to economic actors
who are thus willing to pay to acquire it); LOUIS PHILIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
INFORMATION 23-24 (1988) (discussing costs of time spent by individuals searching for in-
formation). For a general discussion of the decision-making process in acquiring infor-
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maximize the expected returns from a crime that will yield re-
turns at time t + 1.
For example, an offender will need to invest in information
about possible crimes, the punishment attached to each, the like-
lihood of detection, and the costs and benefits of relying on ac-
complices." An offender who chooses to rely on accomplices will
have to search for possible candidates and screen them to assure
that they possess the requisite skills and trustworthiness.59 An of-
fender must also acquire self-evaluative information about his
skills, moral compass, and future willpower.0 However, the earli-
est the offender will receive the benefits from these planning in-
vestments will be at the time that he commits the crime. On occa-
sion, some or all of the returns may not materialize until after the
crime--one can think of the bank robber who delays using the
proceeds from the robbery so as not to invite suspicion or the bur-
glar who must convert the stolen items into cash." These imme-
diate planning expenditures may also produce negative returns if
mation, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION 167-208 (1992). On the costs associated with processing information, see
Herbert A. Simon, Alternative Visions of Rationality, in RATIONALITY IN ACTION:
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 189, 197-200 (Paul K. Moser ed., 1990) (describing role of
bounded rationality in decision-making process).
58. As a general matter, people invest in information in order to make better deci-
sions-making an informed purchase, getting an education, choosing a spouse, or planning
future activities. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 327-31 (1991)
(discussing informational imperfections in marriage market); GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN
CAPITAL 33-51 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the value of education as investment in humans);
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 10-11 (1999) (discuss-
ing the role of planning as a mechanism for dealing with bounded rationality); George J.
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (discussing consumer
search decisions).
59. See infra Section II.B.3.c. (discussing role of immediate costs when offenders rely
on accomplices and co-conspirators).
60. In addition to the external informational asymmetries discussed in the contracting
literature, transacting parties also face internal informational asymmetries: an individu-
al's informational deficits about his talents and propensity to succumb to self-control prob-
lems. See, e.g., Ronald B~nabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An
Economic Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 138 (Isabella
Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) ("[Actors] who usually populate economic models
have little doubt about 'who they are': they know their own abilities and basic prefer-
ences."). A TI offender may procrastinate acquiring self-evaluative information not just
due to its actual cost, but also because it may challenge her positive self-image or under-
mine her self-confidence, both of which can impose immediate disutility. See Roy F.
Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 688-92 (Daniel T.
Gilbert et a. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (summarizing literature on value attached to positive self-
image and strategies used by individuals to insulate it against negative information).
61. In both of these cases, the offender may also enjoy some immediate utility when
he commits the crime.
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the offender decides not to commit the crime or is caught before
he has completed it or right afterwards, before he has received
the full fruit from his labors. As we will see, an offender will vol-
untarily abandon his original plan to carry out the underlying of-
fense if during the planning phase he discovers new information
showing that the underlying offense is not economically worth-
while because the expected costs are greater than the expected
benefits.
b. Investment During the Execution Phase
Carrying out a crime requires the offender to incur immediate
costs. Even if there are no immediate monetary outlays, the of-
fender will still experience immediate disutility from the exertion
of effort, the anxiety of getting caught, and moral conflict. 2 One
would expect that the amount of effort and level of anxiety, both
with their attendant disutility, will increase the greater the like-
lihood that the offender will be caught in the act; what is im-
portant, of course, is the offender's subjective probability63 that he
will encounter resistance from a victim or that the police will ar-
rest him in medias res or right after completing the crime.
c. Investment in Detection Avoidance
Criminals must also expend resources and exert effort to avoid
detection after the crime, such as disposing of incriminating evi-
dence and doing other things to cover-up their tracks." These
62. Even when moral strictures are not sufficient to deter criminal activity, they can
still create internal moral discord. While some criminals are morally bankrupt or at least
morally agnostic, one cannot adopt a blanket assumption. One can plausibly assume that
some potential wrongdoers give weight to moral norms or at least deliberate in their shad-
ows. The cognitive dissonance literature is concerned with explaining how individuals
may, over time, change their internalized moral rules in order to make them comport more
closely with his acts of misconduct. Whether or not a person engages in this type of moral
arbitrage in response to their acts of misconduct, it is likely that such a person had moral
reasons, at least in the back of his mind, when deciding whether or not to engage in mis-
conduct. In other words, it is unlikely that a person can completely turn off his moral com-
pass, at least in the deliberate types of misconduct that concern us and which are the ones
likely to lead to dissonance adjustments. For an overview of the cognitive dissonance liter-
ature, see JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 208-11 (3rd ed. 2000).
63. See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 503-04 (noting that, for deterrence purposes, an
offender's belief of the probability of detection is more important than the actual probabil-
ity).
64. See Sanchirico, supra note 56, at 1352-60 (discussing evidence on avoidance in-
vestments by offenders).
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immediate costs can be higher for repeat offenders and co-
conspirators at least to the extent that their activities involve
greater levels of deception, anxiety, and effort at keeping stories
straight and remembering who has been told what, as well as
who may have overheard, detected inconsistencies, or otherwise
become suspicious." Moreover, co-conspirators will need to moni-
tor each other to assure that no one will defect in order to get a
more lenient sentence."
C. A Restatement of the Offender's Decision-Making Problems
We can now summarize the general intertemporal decision-
making process of rational offenders. In making a decision at
time t, an offender will take into account the instantaneous utili-
ty, if any, that he will receive immediately, ut, which will depend
on the current state of the world, st, and the payoffs, xt, given that
state of the world is u, (x, I s). The offender's goal is to maximize
his intertemporal utility over all relevant periods,67 which is the
sum of the instantaneous utility in each of these periods, properly
discounted to account for (1) the uncertain results due to the un-
certainty regarding future states of the world, which the offender
would consider using his subjective probability distribution over
these future states and (2) the offender's long-term impatience, as
captured by his discount factor, 6. If we let p(s) capture the
probability distribution over possible states in period t + 1, then,
in period t, the offender will first figure out the expected value of
the uncertain payoffs, given this subjective probability assess-
ment, and then discount those expected payoffs by 6 to account
for his impatience. The offender will figure out his expected pay-
offs for period t + 2 in the same way, and again discount them,
this time by 62 . He would do the same for period t + 3, and so on.
After carrying out these calculations, the offender will choose the
65. See Manuel A. Utset, Towards A Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 540, 594-98 (1995) (arguing that the de facto requirement in Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), that managers leave a "paper trail" increases future costs of
changing stories).
66. See Katyal, supra note 28, at 1350-53 (describing monitoring costs within con-
spiracies to prevent defections).
67. In theory, a fully rational decision-maker will choose the course of action in any
one period that would maximize her intertemporal utility over her whole life, taking into
account how she expects to act in future periods. See DellaVigna, supra note 48, at 316-17
(discussing general intertemporal model and its limitations, given the complexity involved
in making such long-term plans).
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course of action that maximizes the sum of these discounted ex-
pected payoffs. With this in mind, we now turn to three general
obstacles faced by intertemporal decision-makers generally and
analyze how these systematic divergences from the full rationali-
ty model can affect the decisions of criminal offenders.
D. Complexity, Bounded Rationality, and Limited Attention
A rational offender will attach subjective probability assess-
ments based on the beliefs he holds at the time.6" The process of
taking in one's environment and observing it is an important type
of interaction since it can lead to a realization that our original
beliefs do not comport with reality.69 Such a realization will lead a
rational actor to update his beliefs to account for any discrepan-
cies.7" In the end, people choose how to act based on a set of be-
liefs regarding (1) the current state of the decision environment
and (2) how their actions will affect that environment. 1 A deci-
sion-maker who has no beliefs about his environment will find it
impossible to choose between different courses of action." At the
68. A belief is a type of disposition to assent to certain propositions about it. If A be-
lieves that X is true, then A would assent to the following proposition: "X is true." To say
that X believes that Napoleon lost at Waterloo just means that X has the disposition to
answer yes if asked: "Did Napoleon lose at Waterloo?" See W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE
WEB OF BELIEF 10 (2d ed. 1978) (stating that a person has belief X if he has a disposition
to assent to questions regarding those beliefs); Radu J. Bogdan, The Manufacture of Belief,
in BELIEF: FORM, CONTENT AND FUNCTION 149, 160-61 (Radu J. Bogdan ed. 1986) (stating
that beliefs "track" certain facts or information about the real world).
69. We can view beliefs as "tracking' certain facts about the real world.
70. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 67-69 (1993) (discussing vari-
ous reasons for privileging true beliefs, but stating that in some rare contexts having false
beliefs can make someone better off); HIRSHLEIFER & RILEY, supra note 57, at 170-78 (de-
scribing the process by which people revise their beliefs to account for new information).
People sometimes take the opposite tack-they revise their observations to make them
conform with their previous beliefs. In short, they engage in cognitive dissonance. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases
and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 647-48 (1997) (describing cognitive
dissonance).
71. See NOZICK, supra note 70, at 99 ("Beliefs about the world feed forward into ac-
tions, and the (perceived) results of these actions . . . feed back, positively or negatively,
upon beliefs.").
72. See FRED DRETSKE, EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR: REASONS IN A WORLD OF CAUSES 79
(1988) (arguing that a model of belief should, in the end, "reveal the way in which what we
believe helps to determine what we do"); FRANK RAMSEY, THE FOUNDATION OF
MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL ESSAYS 238 (1931) ("A belief [is a] map of the neigh-
bouring space by which we steer.").
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same time, a person who believes that his actions will have no ef-
fect whatsoever will have no reason to act.
7 3
1. The Precision of Information About the Offender's
Environment
When an offender interacts with his environment, he will bear
certain observation costs. These costs will tend to increase with
the amount of precision of the observation. A rational offender
will acquire information before making a decision in order to get a
better sense of the true state of his environment. 4 However, as a
general matter, information will only provide him with a partial
view of the environment." An observation is more precise if it
leads to a conclusion that is closer to the true state of the envi-
ronment. By increasing the level of precision of his observations,
an actor will be better able to make decisions that will meet his
underlying goals. As the level of precision decreases, the potential
for erroneous beliefs increases-i.e., the potential that a person
will believe certain things about his environment that are in fact
false. An observer will invest in increasing the precision of his ob-
servations only to the point that the marginal benefits equal the
marginal costs of added precision.76
73. Of course, the person may be mistaken in his belief that his actions are futile, but
since his actions are based on his current beliefs, he will nonetheless not have any reason
to act. On the other hand, a third-party who holds a correct belief about how that person's
intervention can affect the environment may correctly conclude that the person has a rea-
son to act.
74. More generally, a person will want to know whether or not certain propositions
about his environment are true-i.e., that they are true in the current state of the envi-
ronment. See Eddie Dekel & Frank Gul, Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory, in
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, SEVENTH
WORLD CONGRESS 87, 99-101 (David M. Kreps & Kenneth F. Wallis eds., 1997) (describ-
ing the Kripke model of knowledge)
75. See JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY RADNER, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS 47 (1972)
("[As a general matter,] information will give only a partial description of the state of the
world.").
76. An actor will use the information to make a decision that will produce a conse-
quence that will affect his overall utility. The actor's goal is to maximize his utility. One
way to ascertain the value of more precise information is to assume that an actor can ac-
quire additional pieces of information in order to make his overall information set a more
accurate representation of the true state of the environment. For each additional piece of
information, the actor can compare the expected utility if he acts knowing that infor-
mation with the expected utility if he acts without the information. A more formal treat-
ment would require taking into account the fact that an actor may not know ahead of time
the actual content, and thus the value of a piece of information. See, e.g., id. at 85-86 (de-
scribing a way of comparing different types of information structures to ascertain the val-
ue of information).
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2. The Timeliness of Information
A second factor in judging observations is the timeliness of an
observation. An observation is timely if it is made on or before the
point in time in which a decision-maker has to use the infor-
mation. If it is made ahead of time, then one also has to account
for the potential that the accuracy of the information will decline
with the passage of time. Since acquiring information is costly, an
offender will want to take into account the potential that the in-
formation will go stale before he uses it. An offender will have two
choices. He can either wait to acquire the information at the last
possible moment or he may acquire and process the information
ahead of time and, then, update the information before he uses
it." Just as the value of information that is acquired too soon may
depreciate with the passage of time, information that is needed
for a specific point in time and is acquired after the set deadline
may lose value the greater the delay in acquiring it."s
3. The Inherent Complexity of Criminal Misconduct
Committing crimes is a complex undertaking. As a general
matter, the complexity of a decision depends on the number of
factors that a decision-maker needs to take into account and the
way in which those factors interact. 9 As we have seen, a fully ra-
tional offender will need to make probability assessments about
the expected benefits and expected costs of committing a crime,
77. For example, the statements of fact subject to the representation and warranties
of financial contracts, such as underwriting agreements, are processed incrementally-at
the time of bargaining over the contract, during the due diligence process, when drafting
the prospectus, when agreeing to the price of the stock being sold, and at the closing. At
each point, the representation and warranties will be updated to reflect changes between
the different periods. The philosopher Michael Bratman has argued that one reason why
people make plans which they may later abandon is that by planning, an actor can process
ahead of time some of the information that he will need to make a final binding decision.
Thus, planning is one way of dealing with bounded rationality through the incremental
processing of information. See BRATMAN, supra note 58, at 10-11, 29 (1987).
78. Cf. Steve Furr, What is Real Time and Why Do I Need it?, QNX, www.qnx.
comldevelopers/articles/article_298_1.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (drawing a distinc-
tion between hard and soft real-time systems; in the former case, information that is not
acquired by a specified deadline loses all its value, while in the soft system information
depreciates in value).
79. Herbert Simon defined a complex system as "one made up of a large number of
parts that have many interactions," where its complexity will increase whenever, given
"the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to
infer the properties of the whole." HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL
195, 207 (2d ed. 1981).
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both of which require further probabilistic assessments regarding
such matters as the level of law enforcement and vigilance,
prophylactic actions of potential victims, and gross sanctions. The
police can choose two general law enforcement strategies: to make
their presence salient, such as through beat patrolling by uni-
formed officers or to make themselves invisible, carrying out un-
dercover patrolling or sting operations. This dual law enforce-
ment strategy increases the complexity faced by an offender in
assigning a subjective probability assessment to the likelihood of
avoiding detection.
Similarly, potential victims can advertise their crime avoidance
strategies by making salient that they have alarm systems and
guard dogs. A victim may, in addition, have certain hidden crime
prevention abilities, such as carrying a concealed weapon or keep-
ing one in an easily accessible place at home. Again, the various
prophylactic strategies available to victims will increase the level
of complexity faced by a potential offender. This complexity is fur-
ther exacerbated by the fact that individuals without alarm sys-
tems may put stickers on their windows or signs on their front
lawn indicating that they have an alarm or may own a loud but
otherwise useless crime-fighting dog. In other words, the offender
will face a pooling problem similar to those in other areas, such as
in the purchase of health insurance or of a used car."
Finally, determining the gross sanctions for a particular crime
is no easy feat. Prosecutors have great discretion at the time of
charging. They may choose to charge an offender with a single
count or break down the offense into multiple counts, depending
on the context. Prosecutors also have discretion in agreeing to a
plea and a reduced sanction under such an agreement. If the of-
fender is convicted, the judge in turn will have discretion in sen-
tencing, particularly now with the Supreme Court's reigning in of
sentencing guidelines." While a judge's discretion without any
guidelines increases the complexity for offenders making predic-
tions regarding the gross sanctions that they may face, that com-
80. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing an adverse selection problem and
pooling equilibrium when parties who do not have certain properties can mimic parties
who do have those properties-and the general inability of third parties to tell the two
apart).
81. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005) (holding that mandatory
sentencing guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment)
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plexity is arguably less than that under the highly complex man-
datory sentencing guidelines in force before Booker.
4. Bounded Rationality
Offenders face time and computational constraints8 2 when try-
ing to pierce through this complexity and will often be unable to
process and use all of the information in their possession, which
is valuable to making optimal decisions and that they would use
if they had unlimited time and computational ability. Offenders
faced with these constraints, however, will make decisions not as
fully rational actors, but as boundedly rational ones.83 A fully ra-
tional offender would acquire additional information if it would
lead to a better decision, but only to the extent that the added
benefits exceed the costs of acquiring, processing, and using that
information. An offender who is faced with bounded rationality
constraints would do the same, but only up to the point that it is
feasible given his timing and computational constraints." One
important constraint is that, all other things being equal, the
greater the amount of information available to an offender, the
greater the complexity he will face. As a result, an offender con-
strained by bounded rationality will make use of heuristics and
other decisional shortcuts5 that can, in certain instances, lead to
systematic deviations from the fully rational actor model. 6
82. See, e.g., STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN
APPROACH 845-46 (1995) (discussing a challenge of bounded rationality for artificial intel-
ligence).
83. Herbert Simon's work in this area starts with the "observation that human think-
ing powers are very modest when compared with the complexities of the environment in
which human beings live." HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF THOUGHT: VOLUME I 3 (1979).
84. See ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY 87-93 (Karl Gunnar
Persson ed., 1998) (developing an economic model of information acquisition by decision-
makers with bounded rationality).
85. See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCE OF THE ARTIFICIAL 36 (2d ed. 1981) (describ-
ing the boundedly rational decision-maker as "a satisficer, a person who accepts 'good
enough' alternatives, not because he prefers less to more, but because he has no choice");
BRATMAN, supra note 58, at 10-11 (developing a planning theory in which rational actors
make contingent plans in order to deal with bounded rationality-i.e., to space out the de-
cision-making process and make better use of complex information).
86. See AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (arguing that heuristics have benefits
and costs, and can lead to systematic-i.e., non-random-deviations from rational behav-
ior); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (discussing bounded rationality
and heuristics issues within a legal context).
12312013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
5. Complexity, Informational Opacity, and Inattention
A number of studies have found that the opacity of infor-
mation-the lack of transparency and of informational overload-
can exacerbate the bounded rationality problem and lead to fur-
ther systematic mistakes in making decisions.87 These more re-
cent models build on Herbert Simon's work on bounded rationali-
ty, but focus on the fact that an important chain in any decision
process is paying attention to relevant information. An offender
who has a greater capacity for focusing his attention on piercing
through the complexity and opacity of important decisional in-
formation is more likely to make accurate, rational decisions than
offenders with a lesser capacity for tackling opaque information
in a sustained, systematic fashion.
Let v1 be the benefit from the crime received at time 1, and c2,
the expected sanctions. A rational offender will commit the crime
only if
V1 - c2, > 0
Suppose that an offender who has a limited capacity for atten-
tion is making a cost-benefit analysis regarding a potential crime
and that the information that he has about the expected benefits
and expected sanctions is complex. One way of modeling the ef-
fects of this inattention and parsing out the various components
that can affect the level of inattention is by introducing an addi-
tional parameter, 0, that captures the level of inattention. Here,
inattention means that an offender observes a piece of infor-
mation but fails to fully process it and incorporate it into his deci-
87. Studies have found that consumers are less likely to pay attention to hidden taxes,
hidden shipping costs, and financial information revealed on Fridays that is presented in a
nontransparent manner or that requires a decision-maker to draw inferences based on the
interconnection between companies. See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory
and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1145-46 (finding that consumers are less likely to
pay attention to hidden taxes); Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini, Economic Links and
Predictable Returns, 63 J. FIN. 1977, 1978-79 (2008) (finding slow reaction by investors in
company A of incorporating information from company B that has an indirect effect on the
future value of company A); David Hirshleifer et al., Driven to Distraction: Extraneous
Events and Underreaction to Earnings News, 64 J. FIN. 2289, 2323 (2008) (finding greater
inattention when too much information about different companies is released on the same
day); Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan .... Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non)
Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay, 6 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y: ADVANCES
IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1 (2006) (finding that to the extent that those charges are
bundled with the price of the item being sold, purchasers in eBay auctions are less likely
to incorporate the shipping charges into their decision process, as opposed to being pre-
sented as an independent cost).
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sion. He may do so because he does not have the time, the compu-
tational ability, or the requisite incentive and ability to try to
pierce through opaque information to try to make sense of it. Let
o be information that is opaque, and suppose that the information
about the expected benefits and expected sanctions is partially
opaque. The offender would then make a decision based on the
following cost-benefit calculus
Iv, + (1 - ) X oJ - [c2 + ( -9) X oj > 0
If 9 = 1, the offender is fully inattentive; and if 9 = 0, he is fully
attentive. As the level of inattention increases, so will the likeli-
hood that an offender will make sub-optimal decisions about
criminal misconduct. One would expect that an offender who is
making a decision based on a large number of parameters-or one
in which his attention is diverted to other stimuli-will exhibit a
greater level of inattention. Moreover, one way of reducing the
level of inattention is to make the opaque information more sali-
ent. It follows that society is able to increase an offender's level of
inattention by increasing the complexity-the opacity-of infor-
mation about expected sanctions. Similarly, a potential victim can
increase the level of opacity by increasing the costs and difficulty
of determining the expected benefits from committing a crime af-
fecting that victim. Similarly, society can reduce the inattention
problem by making more salient the gross sanctions and increas-
ing the visibility of law enforcement activities.
E. Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Criminal Misconduct
Intertemporal decisions have a long-term and short-term com-
ponent: A person makes 'long-term decisions' on behalf of his fu-
ture self based on the information and preferences he has at the
time, but it is that future self who makes 'short-term decisions'
about whether or not to follow through with those long-term pref-
erences. In doing so, however, the individual will be guided by the
information that he has about the current state of the world and
his preferences at the time."8
88. The standard rational choice model assumes that a person's decision to take an
action is sufficient to cause him to act. However, people change their minds all the time
and fail to take planned actions, sometimes for no apparent reason. Thus, it is helpful to
distinguish between a person's decision to take an action and his decision whether or not
to follow through with that action. See BRATMAN, supra note 58, at 4-5, 29 (discussing the
contingent, reversible nature of plans) ("plans [are defined as] mental states involving an
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A rational offender, therefore, has to predict, at time t, the like-
ly state of the world and state of his preferences, at time t + 1,
and, in particular, anticipate and guard against potential con-
flicts between their long-term and short-term preferences.89 The
fully rational offenders of the standard model are uncertain about
the future states of the world and thus make decisions based on
their subjective probabilities of the expected benefits and ex-
pected costs from committing a crime; however, these fully ra-
tional offenders are not uncertain about their future preferences:
At time t they can, with complete accuracy, predict their prefer-
ences at time t + 1. As a result, these perfectly rational offenders
will exhibit p, perfect self-control-at time t, they make accurate
predictions about their level of impatience (and willpower) and of
their tastes (and thus their preferences) at time t + 1. However,
there is a large body of empirical work finding that individuals
routinely make mispredictions about their future impa-
tience/willpower-which can lead them to exhibit TI preferences
and future tastes which can lead them to exhibit a projection bi-
as. This Section develops a model of criminal misconduct that al-
lows for offenders with TI preferences. The following Section de-
velops a model of criminal misconduct that takes into account the
projection bias.
1. Exponential Discounting and TC Preferences
Recall that a rational offender chooses his behavior over time,
so as to maximize his intertemporal utility, and does so taking in-
to account the uncertainty regarding future payoffs, as well as his
level of impatience. The standard model assumes that offenders
discount delayed payoffs using an exponential discount function.
Under this approach, the offender is assumed to have a discount
factor 6 > 1, that captures his level of impatience between any two
periods. As a result, from the perspective of period t, immediate
payoffs are given full weight, and the instantaneous utility in pe-
appropriate commitment to action; for example, I have plan A only if it is true of me that I
plan to A"); JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION 14-15 (2001) (discussing the gap be-
tween the time a person makes decision and time he follows through) ("[Y]ou cannot sit
back and let the decision cause the action, any more than you can sit back and let the rea-
sons cause the decision.").
89. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118
Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1210 (2003) (stating that when an individual makes an intertemporal
choice, he must account not only for his current preferences, but must also predict how
changes in future states will affect future preferences).
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riodst +1, t+2, t +3,... t +n, are discounted by 6, j2, 63,. . . 5",
respectively. The exponential function has an important charac-
teristic: It will lead to the same discounting results between any
two periods, regardless of when the discounting is carried out,
which is the same as saying that an exponential discounter's util-
ity vis-4-vis delayed payoffs declines at a constant rate over
time.0 As a result, by assuming that offenders make inter-
temporal decisions using an exponential function, the standard
model implicitly assumes that offenders will always exhibit TC
preferences."'
2. Time-Inconsistent Preferences
However, there is a large amount of empirical evidence finding
that, in the real world, individuals have a long-term preference to
behave in a TC manner but make repeated short-term decisions
to override their long-term preference due to the pull of immedi-
ate gratification.92 When an individual reverses his long-term
90. More formally, suppose that in period 0, a person discounts between a payoff of
$1000 in period 5 and $1,500 in period 6. From the perspective of period 0, the person will
make a long-term decision to wait to receive the payoff in period 6 only if (6" * $1500) - (8'
* $1000) > 0. When period 5 arrives, the person will confirm his long-term decision and
wait for the higher payoff in period 6 only if (5 * $1500) - $1000 > 0. Exponential discount-
ing guarantees that a person's long-term and short-term decisions will always coincide,
since (8' * $1500) - (6' * $1000) > 0 implies that (8 * $1500) - $1000 > 0. This follows from
the fact that dividing both parts of the left-hand side of the first equation by 5 yields the
second equation: in other words, [(6' * $1500)/ 5'] - [(6' * $1000)/5'] = (5 * $1500) - $1000.
It is this characteristic of exponential discounting that guarantees a person will exhibit
time-consistent preferences.
91. Unlike the large body of evidence supporting the TI assumption, there is no sys-
tematic evidence finding that people have constant discount rates. See Warren K. Bickel &
Matthew W. Johnson, Delay Discounting: A Fundamental Behavioral Process of Drug De-
pendence, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 419, 422 (George Loewenstein et a]. eds., 2003) (stating that ex-
ponential discounting "has not been empirically supported by behavioral research" con-
ducted in humans and animals); GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 11 (1996)
("The assumption of consistent preferences is clearly not a literal description of much ac-
tual behavior ... but it is an extremely useful simplification of behavior."); Frederick et
al., supra note 54 at 167 (noting that Samuelson and Koopman, the two economists most
responsible for formalizing the TC model, never endorsed the exponential discount func-
tion as an accurate representation of myriad psychological factors that motivate individu-
als to discount future payoffs).
92. The original challenge to the TC assumption came from a series of experiments
finding that people value immediate gratification. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin,
Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999) [hereinafter Doing It Now or Later]
('[TI preferences are due to a] tendency to grab immediate rewards and to avoid immedi-
ate costs in a way that our 'long-run selves' do not appreciate."). In an early experiment,
economist Richard Thaler asked subjects to imagine that they had won a lottery and gave
them the choice of receiving the money immediately or leaving it in the bank, earning in-
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preferences in this manner, he exhibits TI preferences. It follows
that TI individuals do not have a constant discount rate.93 In-
stead, from a long-term perspective, they discount the future in
the same manner as an exponential discounter, their impatience
increases the closer that they get to immediate payoffs, and it is
this increased impatience that can lead them to exhibit self-
control problems.94
terest. The subjects were then asked how much they would require in interest to make
them indifferent between receiving the money immediately rather than later. Thaler
found that the implicit discount rate dropped as the length of the delay in receiving the
money increased. For example, when subjects were given the choice between receiving $15
immediately or in 3 months, 1 year, or 3 years, they required median return required was
$30 for a 3 month delay, $60 for a 6 month delay, and $100 for a 1 year delay. When this is
translated into an explicit continuously compounded discount rate of 277%, 139%, and
63% for a wait of 3 months, 6 months, and a year, respectively. As can be seen, the dis-
count rates of the participating subjects declined over time, something that would not be
allowed under exponential discounting. See RICHARD H. THALER, Some Empirical Evidence
on Dynamic Inconsistency, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 127, 128-30 (1991); see also Uri
Benzion et al., Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGMT.
SCI. 270 (1989) (experiment finding declining discount rates); Gretchen B. Chapman,
Temporal Discounting and Utility for Health and Money, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 771, 771 (1996) (finding steeper discounting over short
delays than longer delays for money rewards and hypothetical health outcomes); Kris N.
Kirby et al., Heroin Addicts Have Higher Discount Rates for Delayed Rewards than Non-
Drug-Using Controls, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 78, 78 (1999) (finding greater
amount of short-term impatience among heroin addicts); Kris N. Kirby & Nino N. Mara-
kovic, Modeling Myopic Decisions: Evidence for Hyperbolic Delay-Discounting within Sub-
jects and Amounts, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 22, 24
(1995) (finding, in an experiment with 22 college students, that hyperbolic function was a
better fit); Kris N. Kirby & Richard J. Herrnstein, Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Dis-
counting of Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 83 (1995) (discussing a similar experi-
ment and results, that when the subjects had the ability to choose the smaller prize im-
mediately they did so; however, when both prizes were delayed, the subjects chose the
better prize); Joel Myerson & Leonard Green, Discounting of Delayed Rewards: Models of
Individual Choice 64 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 263 (1995) (finding in an exper-
iment with 12 undergraduates that hyperbolic function better fit the results than expo-
nential function).
93. Unlike the TC actors of exponential models who have constant discount rates,
people actually exhibit declining discount rates. Economists model declining discount
rates using a hyperbolic discount function instead of an exponential one. See GEORGE
AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 63-80 (1992) (describing evidence of declining discount rates
and the use of hyperbolas to model them); Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Hyperbol-
ic Discounting and Consumption, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS:
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, EIGHTH WORLD CONGRESS 258, 258 (Mathias Dewatripont et
al. eds., 2003) (stating that generalized hyperbolic discount functions decline at a faster
rate in the short-run than in long-run scenarios, matching key feature of experimental da-
ta); George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence
and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573, 579-80 (1992) (setting forth the hyperbolic dis-
count function).
94. As a general matter, people exhibit self-control problems when they "would 'like'
to behave in one manner, but instead 'choose' to behave in another." Ted O'Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, The Economics of Immediate Gratification, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION
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One way to combat potential self-control problems is to take
prophylactic action. For example, a person who is sufficiently
aware of his future self-control problems can adopt a commitment
device, a mechanism that restricts his ability to yield to the tran-
sient pull of immediate gratification when making short-term de-
cisions in the future.95 Some of the strongest evidence that people
have TI preferences comes from the fact that they routinely adopt
such devices.9" Commitment devices are costly to implement, and,
even if they were available at zero cost, people are reluctant to
MAKING 233, 233 (2000); see also George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences
on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272 (1996)
[hereinafter Out of Control] (stating that an individual exhibits self-control problems when
there is a gap between "perceived self-interest and behavior").
95. More generally, a commitment device is a type of externally imposed self-
regulation mechanism adopted to overcome self-control problems, when relying on internal
sources of self-regulation is not sufficient. See RoY F. BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING
CONTROL: How AND WHY PEOPLE FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 6-7 (1994) (describing the
ability among human beings "to exert control over one's own inner states, processes, and
responses" and defining self-regulation as "any effort by a human being to alter its own
responses" so as to override push to act in ways that diverge from what they really want).
96. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, supra note 92, at 105 (describing
economists' use of commitment devices as evidence--"smoking guns"-of TI preferences).
People with long-term preferences to eat healthily, exercise, and lose weight, but who re-
peatedly yield to immediate gratification, join health clubs and go to special weight-loss
spas, both of which require costly up-front commitments. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling,
Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 290, 290 (1978) (discussing
"Christmas Savings" bank accounts, whereby individuals commit to make regular deposits
that cannot be withdrawn until November and individuals who have their employers over
withhold their taxes in order to reduce their tax liability in April); see also Dan Ariely &
Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Pre-
commitment, 13 AM. PSYCHOL. SoC'y 219, 220-23 (2002) (discussing role of self-imposed
deadlines in addressing temptation to procrastinate); Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumption
Self-Control by Rationing Purchase Quantities of Virtue and Vice, 17 MARKETING SC. 317,
317 (1988) (discussing paying a premium to acquire cigarettes as a commitment device).
Drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs require minimum stays and full payment (up
front) for the required treatment period, a part of which is kept if the patient checks out
early. For example, the Cirque Lodge, a well-known facility of this type, has a 30-day min-
imum stay and requires patients to pay for that 30-day period at the time that they check
in. See Admission Guidelines: Cirque Lodge, Sundance, Utah, CIRQUE LODGE,
http://www.cirquelodge.com/Admission/AdmissionGuidelines.php (last visited Apr. 18,
2013) (patients are required to make a deposit of $34,800 for Lodge and $27,750 for studio
at time of check-in).
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restrict their ability to act freely in future periods97 unless they
believe that they will have self-control problems.98
3. TI Misconduct: Criminal-Overconsumption and Criminal-
Procrastination
An important characteristic of criminal misconduct is that
there is always a temporal gap between the time the offender
commits a crime and the first possible moment in which he will
experience the disutility from criminal sanctions. This follows
from the very nature of criminal punishment: An offender must
first be caught and convicted before he can be punished. More-
over, an offender will often receive an immediate return from
committing a crime in the form of money, property, and intan-
gible utility.99 For example, researchers have found that some
criminals get immediate pleasure from violating the law, either
from retaliating against perceived social unfairness or from the
esteem received from fellow criminals.100
In order to model TI offenders, it is helpful to introduce a
second discount factor, fl < 1, which captures an offender's
preference for immediate gratification. This short-term dis-
count factor is only operative when an offender is contemplat-
ing an action in the current period that will allow him to grab
an immediate benefit or incur an immediate cost. If an offender
has a short-term discount factor /3 = 0.5, then from a short-term
97. For example, psychologists have found that individuals often prefer changeable
decisions because they predict, sometimes incorrectly, that they will not be satisfied with
the choices they made. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revi-
sions: The Affective Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 503, 504-07 (2002) (finding that individuals who were given the choice to
change their minds about which photography prints to keep liked their choices less than
those who had no ability to change, and yet individuals still preferred having option to
change).
98. See Ariely & Wertenbroch, supra note 96, at 223 ("A rational decision maker with
time-consistent preferences would not impose constraints on ... her choices.").
99. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
89 (1990) (cataloguing immediate rewards of crime).
100. See e.g., JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ArrRACTIONS IN
DOING EVIL 312, 312 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)("[Criminals take] delight
in deviance [and] take pride in a defiant reputation as bad."); Vai-Lam Mui, The Econom-
ics of Envy, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 311, 312 (1995) (exploring "the role of envy in pro-
voking sabotage or retaliation against others" and stating that "envy plays an important
role in social and economic life"); William Terris & John Jones, Psychological Factors Re-
lated to Employees' Theft in the Convenience Store Industry, 51 PSYCHOL. REP. 1219, 1225
(1982) (finding that revenge is one of the major motivators of employee theft).
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perspective he gives twice as much weight to the immediate
benefits from misconduct than he does from a long-term per-
spective. For example, assume that the immediate benefits
from committing Crime A are $100, then, from a long-term per-
spective, the offender perceives those benefits at their face val-
ue but gives them twice the weight when faced with the oppor-
tunity to commit a crime.
Assume that the benefits from a crime will be received imme-
diately, but the sanction will not be imposed until at least one pe-
riod after the crime is committed. A TI offender gives full weight
to benefits and costs when they are immediate but discounts
them by their short-term discount factor if they are delayed by
one or more periods. The first thing to note is that TC and TI of-
fenders will form long-term and short-term intentions to commit
crimes only if the expected benefits exceed the expected sanc-
tions. Let v1 be the benefits from a crime, which are received in
period 1, and c2 the expected sanctions that are incurred, if at all,
in period 2. From a long-term perspective of period 0, TC and TI
offenders will form an intention to commit the crime only if
(1) V1 > 6 C2
This is because, from a long-term perspective, all benefits and
sanctions are in the future, and as a result, the short-term dis-
count factor does not play a role.1"' This should be comforting giv-
en that this is the principal behavioral assumption of the stand-
ard law and economics model; moreover, it is one that makes
intuitive sense.
From a short-term perspective, TC offenders will always keep
to their original decision (unless they have acquired new infor-
mation)-i.e., they will make a short-term decision using equa-
tion (1). '02 On the other hand, TI offenders make short-term deci-
101. More formally, assume that the long-term expected returns from misconduct are
denoted by v, the long-term expected sanction by s, and cost by c. From a long-term per-
spective the net expected returns from committing a crime in periods 1 through n are: flv,
- Plc,, 8v2 flc, - .... flu. - fic.. A TI offender will have a long-term preference to abstain from
misconduct in any period i in which flv - flc, fi 0 and to engage in misconduct if flv, - fic, > 0.
Since, 0 is constant over all periods we can cancel them out, both types of offenders will
have a long-term preference to abstain from misconduct in any period i in which v, - s, < 0
and to engage in misconduct if v, - c, > 0.
102. For example, if a TC person has concluded that the long term expected returns
from misconduct in period i are v, - s, < 0 he will necessarily conclude that the short-term
expected returns are u, - s, < 0, and vice-versa.
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sions to engage in criminal misconduct whenever the benefits
from the crime exceed the discounted delayed sanctions
(2) v1 >fl6 c2
Since both the long-term discount factor, 6, and the short-term
discount factor, fl, are less than 1, it has to be the case that f8 x 
< 6. As a result, if equation (1) was such that
(la) v, < 6 c2
a TC and a TI offender would make a long-term decision to
obey the law, and while a TC offender will end up abstaining
from misconduct, a TI offender will override his long-term
preferences whenever fP is sufficiently less than 1, such that
equation (2) holds. When an offender reverses his long-term
preference in this manner, he engages in TI misconduct and in-
curs a welfare loss (under the standard assumption that both
TC and TI offenders have a long-term preference to act in a TC
manner-i.e., a long-term preference not to yield to the pull of
immediate gratification).
In conclusion, an offender will engage in TI misconduct
whenever
(3) v,1/8 - 6s2 > 0 > V1 - 6s2 (condition for TI misconduct)
Here, 1/fl is the offender's 'immediacy multiplier;' if he has a fi =
0.5, his immediacy multiplier is 1/0.5 = 2. The difference between
an offender's long-term, undistorted, perception of the expected
benefits from misconduct, vp, and his short-term perception, as
distorted by his immediacy multiplier, is what leads an offender
to engage in TI misconduct. I will refer to this difference between
the distorted and undistorted perception of the benefits from mis-
conduct as the offender's "immediacy premium": v, / - v, > 0.
Finally, the immediate benefits from misconduct are of two
types. First, when a law prohibits a certain type of behavior-
such as embezzlement, burglary, and murder-an offender may
receive immediate utility from engaging in that behavior. Com-
pared to TC offenders, a TI offender will have an incentive to
overconsume prohibited actions of this sort. Secondly, when a law
requires an actor to do something by a specific date-such as fil-
ing a tax return, renewing a driver's license, or making a corpo-
rate disclosure-the immediate benefit in question is the delay in
incurring the immediate disutility of complying with the legal
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rule. Again, compared with TC offenders, a TI offender will have
an incentive to procrastinate complying with this sort of legal
rule.
4. Awareness of Self-Control Problems
We will say that a TI offender is either sophisticated, naive, or
partially naive about his self-control problems. A sophisticated
offender correctly predicts both his future immediacy premium
and thus can anticipate his incentive to make short-term deci-
sions to commit negative-return-crimes. 10 Knowing this, he will
adopt a commitment device to foreclose his future TI misconduct,
as long as it costs less than the aggregate welfare losses from that
misconduct.10'5 On the other hand, a naive TI offender believes in-
correctly that he will act in a TC manner in the future0 6 and will
not see the need to pre-commit.'0 A naive offender thinks that he
has an immediacy premium of $0 and thus will perceive immedi-
ate costs and benefits at their face value. Finally, a partially na-
ive offender knows that he has self-control problems but mispre-
dicts the true magnitude of his immediacy premium.0 8 He will
therefore underinvest in commitment devices or may not adopt
them at all. Importantly, even relatively small prediction errors
can lead a partially naive offender to act in the same manner as a
naive offender. 9
103. See Choice and Procrastination, supra note 47, at 126-27 (developing a model of
partially naive TI actors and distinguishing sophisticated and naive individuals from par-
tially naive individuals who are aware of future self-control problems but underestimate
the magnitude of their future temptation to procrastinate).
104. See Doing It Now or Later, supra note 92, at 108-09 (describing sophisticated in-
dividuals as those who can correctly predict the magnitude of TI preferences).
105. Id. at 113-14.
106. See id. at 108 (stating that naive procrastinators act as if in future periods they
will have TC preferences and will face no self-control problems).
107. Even if a commitment device is free, it still limits the offender's freedom in future
periods. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing the option value of not
precomitting unless offender believes that he will exhibit self-control problems in the fu-
ture).
108. Choice and Procrastination, supra note 47, at 122.
109. This will occur whenever a partially naive offender's mispredictions lead him to
incorrectly believe that his short-run self will conclude that engaging in criminal miscon-
duct has negative expected returns. See id. at 126-27, 141 (concluding that even small
amounts of overoptimism can lead a partially naive person to act in the same manner as a
naive one).
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5. Deterring Criminal-Overconsumption and Criminal-
Procrastination
In designing an optimal deterrence scheme, a lawmaker would
identify harmful behavior that he wants to deter and set the ex-
pected sanctions equal to the expected harm.11° The aim of such a
scheme is not to foreclose all criminal activity but to cause of-
fenders to take into account the harm that they produce." For
example, if securities fraud produces a harm of $10,000, and
there is a 50% probability that a violation will be detected and
punished, then the optimal fine is $20,000.112 This will assure that
the expected sanctions and harm both equal $10,000 and that a
utility-maximizing offender will engage in fraud only if the bene-
fits he receives exceed the harm created.
Society can provide TI offenders with mandatory commitment
devices in the form of criminal sanctions. TI offenders who are
sufficiently sophisticated will adopt commitment devices on their
own, but, all other things being equal, they should be indifferent
between private and public devices. From a social welfare point of
view, however, a lawmaker should choose the approach that
would minimize the costs of commitment and that effectively de-
ter TI offenders without over-deterring TC offenders (at least past
the point in which the social loss from over-deterrence is greater
than the social gains from deterring TI misconduct).
110. By setting the expected sanctions equal to the expected harm, the lawmaker as-
sures that an offender internalizes the harm from his activities. If the offender receives a
benefit that exceeds the expected harm then society would be better off if he commits the
crime. See Becker, supra note 30, at 181-85 (calculating aggregate welfare by taking into
account the benefits offenders receive from their criminal activity). As a result, the law
and economics approach to criminal sanctions mirrors that for choosing the optimal dam-
ages for tort violations. In both scenarios, the aim is to make sure that, at the time that an
actor chooses to engage in an activity, he incorporates into his cost-benefit analysis the
expected harm that he may produce. See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 456-57, 474-79 (dis-
cussing analogous strict liability and fault-based rules in tort and criminal law contexts).
111. Some crimes, like murder, rape, and armed robbery, require total deterrence be-
cause they produce harm that is so serious in nature that it trumps any plausible legiti-
mate benefits to criminals. In order to affect complete deterrence, these crimes require the
maximum sanction. See ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 30, at 1196-97,
1215-16 (discussing criminal activity, much falling under the rubric of common law
crimes, that society has determined calls for total deterrence). However, the crimes in-
volved in corporate settings rarely call for total deterrence.
112. As a general matter, suppose that an offense produces a harm, h, and the proba-
bility of detection is p. When the sanction, s, is discounted by p - p * s -and if we set p *
s = h, then the optimal sanction is reached by multiplying the harm by the probability
multiplier 11p. Therefore, the optimal sanction is hip.
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Because TI offenders engage in TI misconduct whenever the
delayed sanctions are less than the immediate benefits, as dis-
torted by his immediacy multiplier, lawmakers can use five gen-
eral strategies to deter TI offenders. Three strategies target
offenders' short-term preferences, and two strategies target of-
fenders' long-term preferences.
a. Targeting Short-Term Preferences
First, in the case of criminal-overconsumption, a lawmaker can
adopt legal rules and enforcement strategies that delay when an
offender receives the proceeds from misconduct; and in the case of
criminal-procrastination, a lawmaker can delay when an individ-
ual has to incur the immediate costs to comply with the legal
rule. Second, if it is not possible to completely delay the receipt of
immediate benefits or incurrence of immediate costs, lawmakers
can still deter TI misconduct by reducing these immediate bene-
fits/costs by an amount that extinguishes the immediacy premi-
um. Suppose that an offender has an immediacy multiplier of 2
and that the delayed sanction for burglary and filing late tax re-
turns is $150. If a burglary would yield an immediate benefit of
$100, then the offender is under-deterred by $50. Since the of-
fender gives twice as much weight to each $1 reduction in the
immediate benefits, reducing them by $25.25 would deter him.113
Similarly, if the TI individual has to pay $100 in taxes at the time
of filing, he will have an incentive to procrastinate. However, if he
is allowed to delay paying $25.25 of those taxes until a later date,
he will file on time. Third, a lawmaker can deter a TI offender by
offsetting the immediate benefits/costs that are motivating him to
engage in misconduct. As we just saw, a lawmaker can deter the
burglary by decreasing the immediate benefits by $25.25; howev-
er, the lawmaker can achieve the same results by increasing by
the same amount the immediate costs the offender must incur to
commit the crime. Similarly, in order to foreclose the incentive to
procrastinate filing taxes, the government can provide the tax-
payer with an immediate benefit of $25.24 at the time of filing
and later increase the taxes by that same amount. 114
113. In this case the offender would perceive distorted immediate benefits of $74.75 x 2
= $149.50, which is less than the delayed sanctions of $150. A lawmaker can achieve the
same result by delaying the receipt of $25.50 of the proceeds from the crime.
114. The TI individual's incentive to procrastinate is due to the fact that $100 x 2
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b. Targeting Long-Term Preferences
Another strategy for deterring TI misconduct is to increase the
delayed sanctions. In the above example, the delayed sanctions
for burglary or filing a late tax return will have to be increased by
more than $50 (assuming that the offender will commit the crime
if he is indifferent), which, as can be seen, is greater than the
change needed, if the lawmaker directly targets the short-term
preferences of TI offenders. It follows that in a world with TC and
TI offenders, it is impossible to achieve optimal deterrence by re-
lying solely on delayed sanctions. The intuition behind this result
is the following: The harm produced by both types of offenders is
the same, but given the immediacy multiplier of TI offenders, the
delayed sanctions needed to effectively deter each are different.
As a result, if the delayed sanctions are set equal to the expected
harm, as prescribed by the standard law and economics approach,
TC offenders will be optimally deterred, but their TI counterparts
will be necessarily underdeterred (whenever the TI misconduct
conditions are met). On the other hand, if the delayed sanctions
are set sufficiently high to effectively deter TI misconduct, then
the TC offender will be overdeterred since those sanctions will be
greater than the expected harm from misconduct. As a result, a
final strategy for deterring TI misconduct that alleviates this
general problem is to increase the salience of the delayed sanc-
tions when offenders are making short-term decisions whether or
not to commit a crime.
115
F. The Projection Bias
When an offender makes an intertemporal choice at time t, he
has to try to predict the preferences that he will have at time t +
1, when he receives the payoffs from that decision or has to make
a short-term decision to follow through with a planned course of
action. Numerous empirical studies have found that when indi-
viduals try to predict their future preferences, they tend to project
their current preferences (as influenced by the psychological
$200, which exceeds the delayed sanctions by $50. The TI individual would perceive an
immediate benefit as $25.24 x 2 = $50.48. By complying on time, the individual receives
$50.48 and avoids sanctions of $150, which together provides him with net benefit greater
than $200.
115. See George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2-4
(1991) (discussing the role of salience in combating incentive to procrastinate).
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states that they are in at the time) onto those future preferences.
This leads them to systematically mispredict how their prefer-
ences, as well as those of others, will evolve over time. '16 This Sec-
tion begins by discussing the projection bias in the context of in-
tra-personal predictions. It then describes the evidence on inter-
personal projection bias, which arises when one person is trying
to predict how someone else's preferences will evolve over time.
The projection bias is particularly prominent when people are
in a 'hot' psychological state either at the time when they make
an intertemporal decision or when they are called to follow
through with one of their past decisions." 7 Hot psychological
states include such states as anger, hunger, fear, depression,
jealousy, infatuation, curiosity, anxiety, sleepiness, pain, sexual
arousal, and the craving of addictive substances such as drugs,
alcohol, and nicotine."'
116. For example, a study of the preferences of pregnant women regarding the use of
anesthesia during labor found that when the women were asked about their preferences
one month before labor, while they were in a cold psychological state, the women preferred
not to use anesthesia; however, when the women were in the pain of active labor, their
preferences changed to wanting anesthesia. J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Func-
tions and the Measurement of Patients' Values: Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4
MED. DECISION MAKING 47, 50-53 (1984). Sexual arousal can also lead to incorrect predic-
tions regarding future preferences. See George F. Loewenstein et al., The Effect of Sexual
Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 455-56
(1997) (describing a study finding that male subjects who were shown sexually arousing
photographs were more likely to predict that they would act sexually aggressively on a
date than those who were not shown arousing photographs). There is evidence that indi-
viduals also tend to underestimate how much they will crave drugs, alcohol, and nicotine
when they are exposed to drug, alcohol, and cigarette "cues." See David Laibson, A Cue-
Theory of Consumption, 116 Q.J. ECON. 81, 81-82 (2001) (discussing role of environmental
"cues" on habit-forming behavior such as smoking and addiction); Out of Control, supra
note 94, at 272-80 (discussing role of visceral factors on impulsivity).
117. See George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q.
J. ECON. 1209, 1212-16 (2003) [hereinafter Projection Bias] (developing projection bias
model to provide theoretical underpinning for evidence on hot state decision-making). Un-
der the projection bias model, an individual's predictions of his future preferences will
tend to lie somewhere in between the true preferences that he will have in the future and
his current preferences. Id. at 1210-11.
118. See George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice: Predicting Future
Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATION OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 98 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Wouldn't It Be Nice] (discussing "hot" states, such
as anger, hunger, pain, and sexual excitement). An individual may go from being in a cold
psychological state to being in a hot one when he experiences certain emotional or biologi-
cal triggers. See Out of Control, supra note 94, at 273 (discussing how visceral factors are
triggered by such factors as stimulation and deprivation). All of these hot states and anal-
ogous ones share three important characteristics. First, they are temporary or transient.
Hot states do not last forever; eventually a person will find himself back in a cold, unper-
turbed state, although how long hot states last may vary. Second, hot states focus the de-
cision-maker's attention: They motivate him, whether consciously or unconsciously, to act
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For example, assume that an individual is to attend a meeting
and has to order his lunch one week in advance. He can choose ei-
ther the spartan one-course lunch or the gargantuan four-course
one. In making this intertemporal choice, the individual should
try to predict how hungry he will be the following week and
choose accordingly-if he expects to be in a hungry state, he
should choose the gargantuan package, but if he expects to be
sated, he should choose the spartan one. His choice should not be
influenced by whether, at the time of ordering, he happened to be
hungry or sated: if he puts in his order early in the morning when
he is full from a hearty breakfast, his choice should coincide with
the one he would make if his orders late in the day, when he is
starving and looking forward to a large dinner.
However, a number of studies have found that individuals suf-
fer from a projection bias in such instances-they tend to allow
the state they were in at the time they ordered (hungry or sated)
to unduly affect their intertemporal choice.119 This is the case even
though being hungry or sated are feelings that individuals expe-
rience daily and which one would expect they would become bet-
or refrain from acting. Hot states may distract or intercept a decision-maker's delibera-
tions, prod him to act without giving much thought to the consequences, or take over com-
plete control of the reasoning process. Third, hot states are not isolated perturbations of
our psyches; they pervade the lives of individuals, they appear, disappear, and they recur.
See id. at 272-74 (discussing the differences between visceral factors and preferences).
119. A number of studies have found that individuals tend to project their current level
of hunger or satedness onto their predictions of how hungry or sated they expect to be in
future periods, as well as onto other related preferences. In one study, individuals had to
choose between fruit or junk food to be received in one week. Daniel Read & Barbara van
Leeuwen, Predicting Hunger: The Effects of Appetite and Delay on Choice, 76
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 189, 196-97 (1998). Some individ-
uals made the choice while hungry, others while sated. Id. at 196. The study found that a
larger proportion of the hungry group than the sated group chose the unhealthy junk food
over the fruit. Id. at 200. In another study, supermarket shoppers were asked before they
went into the store to make a shopping list of the items that they intended to purchase.
Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Future is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting,
88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430, 437-38 (2002). Some shop-
pers were given a muffin to eat before shopping (the sated group), while other shoppers
were not given a muffin (the hungry group). Id. at 438. Shoppers who did not eat a muffin
before entering the store purchased a larger proportion of unplanned items (items not on
their shopping list) than shoppers in the sated group. Id. at 439. The result held true in-
dependently of whether or not the shoppers were allowed to take the shopping list into the
store. Id. Shopping lists, however, may act as a sort of self-regulation mechanism. See
Russell Abratt & Stephen Donald Goodey, Unplanned Buying and In-Store Stimuli in Su-
permarkets, 11 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 111, 117-18 (1990) (presenting a study of
supermarket shoppers in which shoppers without shopping lists claimed that twenty-five
percent of their purchases were unplanned, while shoppers with shopping lists claimed
that only sixteen percent of their purchases were unplanned).
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ter at predicting.'2 ° A projection bias has also been found in in-
stances when hot psychological states are not present, such as
when individuals try to predict the full magnitude of the endow-
ment effect.'
21
Two principal types of hot-state distortions can lead decision-
makers to incorrectly predict their future preferences. First, a de-
cision-maker making an intertemporal choice while in a cold psy-
chological state will tend to underappreciate the full magnitude of
changes in his preferences caused by future hot states.12 Second,
a decision-maker making an intertemporal choice while in a hot
psychological state will tend to mispredict how long the hot state
120. While one would expect that repeated exposure to the same or analogous hot
states will lead to a learning effect, the evidence suggests otherwise. See Christensen-
Szalanski, supra note 116, at 51 (finding that pregnant women who mispredicted that
their preferences regarding anesthesia would change when in active labor again mispre-
dicted when asked a month after labor); Leaf Van Boven et al., Mispredicting the Endow-
ment Effect: Underestimation of Owners' Selling Prices by Buyer's Agents, 51 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 351, 362-63 (2003) (discussing learning limitations in endowment-effect
projection bias). Moreover, even though some individuals are aware at some level that
they will experience a projection bias in the future, when they are in the midst of hot
states they once again succumb to the bias. See also Projection Bias, supra note 117, at
1215 (illustrating an example of folk wisdom to "never shop on an empty stomach" as evi-
dence of awareness of projection bias).
121. Numerous studies have found an endowment effect, which leads individuals to
value things more when they own them than when they do not own them. See, e.g., Daniel
Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
5 J. ECON. PERSP., 193, 193-96 (1991) (showing that the endowment effect didn't disappear
when there was a market with ample learning opportunities); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1325, 1325 (1990) (using a test of randomly given coffee mugs to show that willingness to
accept greatly exceeds willingness to pay); George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in
the Prediction of Tastes, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 726, 730-34 (Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (finding that individuals, when asked to predict how much
they would charge to sell an item once they owned it, underappreciated how attached they
would become to the item and how much they would then wish to charge for the item
when selling it). In addition, predictions regarding future curiosity can also be distorted by
a projection bias. In one study, individuals were asked to answer ten geography questions
and asked to choose whether they wanted to receive a candy bar or the answer to the
questions. Wouldn't It Be Nice, supra note 118, at 93. One group was first shown a ran-
domly chosen question and asked, before they had seen the rest of the questions, to choose
between receiving the answers to the ten questions or a candy bar; a second group was
shown all ten questions first and only afterwards asked whether they preferred the an-
swers to the questions or a candy bar. Id. Those individuals who had to choose between
the candy bar and the answers before receiving the rest of the questions were significantly
more likely to choose to receive the candy bar rather than the answers. Id. Compared to
the other group's action, they seemed to be underestimating how curious they would be to
receive the answers once they had seen all of the questions. Id. at 94.
122. See Out of Control, supra note 116, at 281 (arguing that individuals tend to under-
estimate the impact of hot states on their future actions).
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will last'23 and how different he will feel in the future when he is
back in a cold state; this is true even though the decision-maker
knows that the hot state is transient in nature and will eventual-
ly come to an end. 124 For example, an individual who is trying to
quit smoking may determine to meet a friend at a smoky bar,
even though he knows that seeing others smoke may make him
feel like smoking. At the time he agrees to go to the bar, his cold-
state prediction-that once in the bar he would be able to ab-
stain-will tend to underappreciate how much his preferences
will actually change once he is exposed to the cues of others
smoking.'2' Moreover, once he is in the bar, feeling the full pull of
nicotine and smoke, he may decide to light up for the first time in
a year, underappreciating how he will feel the next day when he
is back in a cold state and realizes that he smoked the night be-
fore.
Importantly, the claim is not that individuals do not know they
are experiencing potentially transient feelings, although if they
are in the midst of a visceral state of high enough intensity-for
example, infatuation-they may not be fully cognizant of it. In-
stead, the problem is that, while individuals may fully under-
stand that going from cold states to hot ones, or vice versa, will
have some effect on their preferences, they still tend to underap-
preciate by how much their preferences will change. 2 '
G. The Projection Bias and Criminal Misconduct
When deciding whether to commit a crime x, at time t, an of-
fender has to try to predict his instantaneous utility at time t + 1.
Suppose first that an offender is trying to predict the disutility
that he will feel if he is caught, convicted, and punished. Let v, be
the benefit from the crime received at time 1, and c2 be the ex-
123. Individuals tend to incorrectly predict how long certain feelings will last, even
though they experience those feeling repeatedly. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Lessons
from the Past: Do People Learn from Experience that Emotional Reactions are Short-
Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1648, 1648 (2001).
124. See Projection Bias, supra note 117, at 1228-29 (discussing irreversible decisions
made by individuals while in hot states, believing incorrectly that hot states would persist
for longer periods).
125. For a discussion of the way that environmental cues can lead to changes in prefer-
ences, see Laibson, supra note 116, at 108.
126. See Projection Bias, supra note 117, at 1210 (stating that under the projection bias
model, a decision-maker correctly predicts the direction of his changes in preferences but
underappreciates the full magnitude of those changes).
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pected sanctions (to isolate the projection bias problem, I will as-
sume that the offender knows that there is a 100% probability
that he will be apprehended). So the optimal gross sanctions are
equal to the harm from the offender's misconduct. A rational of-
fender will commit the crime only if
V1 -C 2, >0
Moreover, setting the sanctions equal to c2 will lead an offender
to violate the law only when it would maximize social welfare.
However, an offender subject to the projection bias measures
his utility based both on the actual payoff as well as the state
that he is in at the time of receiving that payoff. So let s1 and S2 be
the offender's state at times 1 and 2, respectively; the states cap-
ture the offender's tastes at the time, which can be distorted by
emotions and hot psychological states, as well as the fact that he
has received an immediate benefit or incurred an immediate cost
at the time. The offender will try to predict his instantaneous
utility in period 2, where his true utility will be u 2 (c2, s2). Let a
capture an offender's level of projection bias.
Let U2predicted (cs,2 I s) be the offender's prediction of his period 2
utility given that at the time that he makes the prediction in pe-
riod 1 the state is s1 .
Then the offender's projection bias is captured by
u2predited (c2, s2 I s) = (1 - a) u, (c2, s) + a u2 (c2, s1)
If a = 0, then the offender has no projection bias and accurately
predicts his period 2 utility: u2 (c2, s). On the other hand, if a = 1,
then the offender's prediction is fully distorted by his current
state, in that he perceives his future tastes to be identical to his
current tastes: u2 (c2, s).
An offender who were to accurately predict the future disutility
from the expected criminal sanctions would violate the law only
in cases in which
u, (v, s) - u2 (c2, s) > 0
However, given the projection bias an offender will commit a
crime whenever
U1 (vI, s) - u2predited (c2, s, I s ) > 0
And since (1 - a) u2 (c2, s) + a u, (c2, s) > u2 (c2, s), whenever a <
1, it follows that an offender with the projection bias will some-
124920131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
times violate the law in cases in which a fully rational offender-
one not subject to the projection bias-would obey the law.
III. INCHOATE OFFENSES UNDER THE BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF
CRIME
This Section uses the behavioral theory of criminal misconduct
developed in Section II to provide a set of new explanations for
the existence of inchoate offenses and for why they are punished
less harshly than the completed underlying offense.
A. The General Problem
Before turning to the behavioral explanations of inchoate of-
fenses, it is helpful to further unpack the general problem of justi-
fying these offenses under the standard law and economics ap-
proach. A lawmaker who wants to optimally deter offenders from
committing an underlying offense will set the expected sanctions
equal to the expected harm. If the gross sanction is in the form of
a fine, wealth-constrained offenders will be under-deterred. One
way to deal with this problem is to create inchoate offenses: an of-
fender then would take into account both the expected sanctions
if he succeeds with the underlying offense and the inchoate ex-
pected sanctions if he fails. This allows a lawmaker to reduce the
gross sanction for the underlying offense. This justification for the
existence of inchoate offenses does not, however, explain why
they are punished less severely than the underlying offense. If
the optimal gross sanctions for the underlying offense are $200,
there is no reason why the gross sanction for the underlying of-
fense has to be greater than $100; in fact, one can envision a re-
gime in which the expected sanction remain the same, but the
gross sanctions for inchoate offenses are set higher than those for
the underlying offense.
It is true that punishing inchoate offenses less severely can
lead an offender to renounce his plan to commit the underlying
offense; but if that is the rationale, one would expect that the
lower sanctions would apply only to cases when an offender who
has triggered an inchoate offense makes a willful, fully voluntary
decision not to follow through with the underlying offense. The
sanctions should not be lower, however, for an unsuccessful at-
tempt; for an attempt that is interrupted by the police, victim, or
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third party; for a solicitation that is rejected; and for a conspiracy
in which the co-conspirators are arrested before they have com-
pleted the underlying offense. But the penalty for these inchoate
offenses are generally lower than those for the underlying of-
fense.
1 27
There is an additional limitation to the standard law and eco-
nomics justification for the existence of inchoate offenses. To the
extent that offenders are wealth constrained, there is a more
straightforward approach to handle the problem: Society can in-
crease the probability of detecting offenders who have committed
the underlying offense. In order to accomplish this, society has to
spend more on enforcement, which is what the standard approach
is trying to avoid. However, suppose that by making use of incho-
ate offenses, society is able to reduce the probability of detection
for the underlying offense to 0.01. Then the probability of detec-
tion for the inchoate offense will also be very low. In theory, socie-
ty should spend even less on enforcing inchoate offenses, given
that those offenses do not create any actual harm that needs de-
terring. Inchoate offenses, however, are enforcement-intensive
crimes, for they leave a relatively faint trace: There are no vic-
tims and no harm, only potential offenders and actual or potential
accomplices or co-conspirators. Getting it right, moreover, mat-
ters for inchoate offenses, if for no other reason than that the so-
cial costs from punishing innocent behavior or evil thoughts can
be much higher than the cost of under-deterring wealth con-
strained offenders. Law enforcement therefore has to monitor po-
tential offenders to detect behavior (in real-time-before the
commission of the underlying offense) that is sufficient to indicate
a high likelihood that an underlying offense will be committed.
And to accomplish this, society has to invest in enforcement. But
all other things being equal it is better for society to increase en-
forcement so as to increase the likelihood of detecting the under-
lying offense; if it does that, then the underlying rationale for
punishing inchoate offenses disappears, or is, at the very least,
greatly reduced. This inchoate offense paradox can be restated as
follows: Society can economize on enforcement costs for the un-
derlying offense by punishing inchoate offenses; but if society
economizes on enforcement costs, then it is unlikely to detect,
with sufficient accuracy, inchoate offenses.
127. The sanctions for these types of inchoate offenses are generally higher than for
those in which the offender voluntarily renounces the underlying offense but is unable to
escape liability altogether.
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B. Complexity, Inattention, and Inchoate Liability
Inchoate offenses increase the overall complexity of planning
and executing the underlying offense. A crime's complexity will
increase with the number of factors that an offender must take
into account in order to succeed with his underlying goal-
executing the underlying offense and escaping detection. These
factors will interact with each other, and thus a crime's overall
complexity will increase the less transparent and more compli-
cated these interactions. Inchoate offenses, therefore, require of-
fenders to take more factors into account, to do so sooner than
they would otherwise; and some of these additional factors will
interact in non-transparent ways. For example, suppose that
Frank asks Anne to kill Brenda on his behalf. Criminal solicita-
tion increases the overall complexity faced by Frank, given that
he may not know if Anne is an undercover policewoman. If solici-
tation is not a crime, Frank can solicit Anne and if she rejects
him (or he discovers that she does not have the skill to successful-
ly execute the crime), he can approach others until he finds a
right match. If Frank agrees with Anne to kill Brenda, both he
and Anne are liable for conspiracy. This too increases the com-
plexity of killing Brenda, given that Frank now has to worry
about the likelihood that Anne would turn him into the authori-
ties; if conspiracy is not a crime, things are simpler, since Frank
can always back out at any point before the actual underlying of-
fense. If Frank decides to commit the crime alone he has to worry
about potential liability for criminal attempt; if on the other hand
he can plan, fully prepare, lie in wait, and shoot Brenda only after
making sure that there is no one around, the level of complexity
is lower.
All other things being equal, one would expect that an offender
is more likely to execute a crime successfully and to get away
with it, the lower the complexity involved. In other words, com-
plexity not only increases the underlying costs of committing the
underlying offense, it also increases the likelihood that the of-
fender will fail or that he will be arrested. Inchoate offenses
therefore help deter crimes by increasing the complexity and thus
the uncertainty faced by a potential offender.
Society spends more enforcing underlying offenses and incho-
ate offenses than what one would expect if policymakers were
guided by the standard Beckerian account of deterrence. In fact,
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society spends large amounts of resources in undercover activities
aimed directly at detecting inchoate offenses and apprehending
offenders before they have had a chance to commit the underlying
offense. Why? As we have seen, one possible explanation is that
undercover activities increase a crime's overall complexity by in-
creasing the risk of interacting with others. An offender planning
a crime may not only solicit others or conspire with them but may
have to reconnoiter or acquire weapons, burglar's tools, or other
potentially incriminating equipment, which opens them to liabil-
ity under possession crimes and/or attempt. But there is a second
reason for the relative popularity of undercover activities: An of-
fender intent on committing a crime will give relatively greater
attention to the final goal-the underlying offense-than to the
preparatory activities. In other words, the salience of committing
the underlying offense will be greatest at the point in which the
offender is executing the offense-when Frank has aimed his gun
at Brenda and is about to shoot. Under the inattention model in-
troduced in Section II, one would expect that the less salient fea-
tures of committing a crime-during the planning, preparatory
stage-will be more opaque and receive less attention from of-
fenders. Co-conspirators are most likely to lower their guard-to
be less attentive-while planning a bank robbery than in the
middle of it; an undercover agent, who becomes part of the con-
spiracy during these preparatory stages is more likely to succeed
in acquiring valuable evidence, for example. Criminal solicitation
is particularly susceptible to this type of inattention problem,
since the offender is twice removed from the underlying offense-
he is in the process of recruiting an agent to act on his behalf, at
some point in the future, to commit the underlying offense. Simi-
lar arguments apply to the preparatory stages in which an of-
fender can trigger attempt liability.
There is an additional relationship between complexity and in-
choate crimes. All other things being equal, one would expect that
the more complex the underlying offense, the more likely that an
offender will (1) have to spend more time and effort to plan and
prepare for the underlying offense and that he will have to inter-
act with third parties who may either be undercover police, whis-
tleblowers, or untrustworthy or unreliable actors who may expose
the offender to liability either intentionally or negligently; (2) re-
quire the assistance of an accomplice or co-conspirator; or (3) need
to fully delegate the commission of the crime to a third party with
the requisite expertise. The first increases the likelihood that an
2013] 1253
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offender will trigger attempt liability; the second, the likelihood
that he will trigger accomplice or conspiracy liability; and the
third, the likelihood that he will trigger criminal solicitation.
In conclusion, underlying offenses that are the most likely to
trigger inchoate liability are precisely those that are complex
enough that they cannot be executed as "on-the-spot" crimes-
those in which the offender can, at the same time, learn of the
criminal opportunity and successfully execute the crime (includ-
ing avoiding detection). While one expects that there are relative-
ly few on-the-spot crimes, the farther one moves from that ideal,
the more likely that inchoate liability will come into play. Moreo-
ver, inchoate liability increases the overall complexity of commit-
ting an underlying offense, which in turn increases the immedi-
ate cost of planning, executing, and covering it up. This will have
a direct increasing overall deterrence, since an offender's will is
deterred by the aggregate costs of committing crimes: criminal
sanctions and transaction costs. It also allows society to econo-
mize on enforcement, given the inattention problem inherent dur-
ing the inchoate phase of a crime. But as we will now see, increas-
ing the immediate transaction costs of committing crimes will
have a disproportionate effect on TI offenders and thus will have
a greater deterrence effect than increasing delayed sanctions by
the same amount. Inchoate crimes increase transaction costs not
only by increasing complexity but by requiring offenders to make
immediate prophylactic investments before the commission of the
underlying offense.
C. Inchoate Crimes as Commitment Devices for Time-Inconsistent
Offenders
This Section examines inchoate crimes from the perspective of
TI offenders and provides a new justification for inchoate liabil-
ity-as a commitment device to deter TI misconduct. Recall that
an offender has an incentive to engage in TI misconduct whenev-
er two conditions hold: (1) from a long-term perspective (when the
crime is in the future), the benefits from misconduct are less than
the expected sanctions, and thus the offender has a preference to
obey the law; and, (2) at the time when he has the opportunity to
commit the crime, the immediate benefits he receives (as distort-
ed by his immediacy multiplier) exceed the delayed expected
sanctions. TI misconduct can only occur when there is a temporal
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gap between the immediate benefit from misconduct and the de-
layed sanctions. In a large number of crimes, the offender re-
ceives the benefits from committing the offense at the same time
that he causes the harm. The bank robber, the burglar, and the
drug dealer receive the benefits from their crimes at the same
time that they create the harm that society has sought to crimi-
nalize and punish, either out of concern for retribution or deter-
rence. When one combines the immediacy of the benefit with the
necessarily delayed nature of the punishment for all criminal of-
fenses, offenders with TI preferences will have an incentive to
overindulge on these crimes.
As we saw in Section II, society can effectively deter TI mis-
conduct by delaying all or part of the immediate benefits from
misconduct. One way to accomplish this is to divide a crime into
two parts. In the first part, the offender triggers a delayed sanc-
tion but does not receive an immediate benefit; in the second part
of the crime, the offender receives an immediate benefit and trig-
gers a delayed sanction. How can society accomplish this? One
way is to introduce inchoate offenses.
An inchoate offense always triggers legal liability before the of-
fender is able to receive the benefits from the underlying offense.
It is a crime for which an offender will receive a benefit only indi-
rectly, and in the future, if he is able to successfully complete the
underlying offense. An offender who takes substantial steps to-
ward carrying out a bank robbery will trigger liability for crimi-
nal attempt, but if he is caught before he can commit the robbery,
he will incur a penalty without enjoying the benefits from the un-
derlying offense. Moreover, as a general matter, inchoate offenses
complicate matters for an offender, who may need to engage in
additional planning to assure that he will not be arrested before
he has been able to complete the underlying offense and enjoy its
rewards. They may also increase the anxiety (the immediate dis-
utility) faced by offenders when they are planning or executing a
crime. Inchoate offenses, in short, will, in many instances, in-
crease the immediate costs that an offender must incur before he
commits to the underlying offense and before he takes concrete
steps to carry it out. They can, therefore, increase the likelihood
that an offender will underinvest in planning and executing a
crime and the likelihood that she will engage in TI obedience. In-
sufficient planning will, in turn, increase the likelihood that an
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offender will be caught and punished for an inchoate crime, the
underlying offense, and, in certain instances, both.
So one can model a crime, A, as having two components: the in-
choate offense and the underlying offense. The benefits from the
commission of A are received only upon the successful completion
of the underlying offense. The delayed sanctions for the inchoate
offense are triggered once the offender has taken the necessary
steps for criminal attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy. Important-
ly, the inchoate offense does not produce an immediate benefit to
an offender; it is instead an initial investment for the commission
of the underlying offense. Since both the benefits and sanctions
are all in the future, a TI offender's immediacy multiplier does
not come into play. It follows that an offender would never engage
in TI misconduct vis-A-vis the inchoate offense. Suppose that an
offender is in period 0 considering whether to commit an inchoate
offense in period 1 (planning and otherwise preparing for the un-
derlying offense), which in turn would allow him to commit the
underlying offense in period 2, where the underlying offense, if
successful will provide an immediate benefit, v2, of expected sanc-
tions from the inchoate offense, s1 o, and the underlying offense,
Suo, are incurred, if at all, in period 3. Both TC and a TI offenders
will have a long-term preference to commit an inchoate offense
only if the future expected benefits at the time of completing the
underlying offense exceed the expected sanctions from the two
crimes: the inchoate offense and the underlying offense. A TC of-
fender will make short-term decisions that confirm her original
long-term one, and, as a result, will commit crime A only if
V2 20 So3 + SU03
On the other hand, a TI offender will have a short-term incen-
tive to commit crime A whenever
V2 // So3 + SU0 3
In theory, a TI offender will be under-deterred by the aggre-
gate sanctions for the inchoate offense and the underlying offense
that are optimal for a TC offender. However, as we will now see,
inchoate liability can act as a commitment device.
An example can help illustrate the general intuition behind
this result. Suppose that there is a TC and a TI offender and that
the latter has an immediacy multiplier of 2 and is sophisticated
in the sense that he can correctly predict his future self-control
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problems. 28 At time 0, both offenders are deciding whether to
commit crime A, which will require them to invest in the inchoate
offense in period 1 before they can commit the underlying offense
at time 2. For example, assume that in order to carry out the un-
derlying offense, the offender has to prepare for the crime in a
manner that will trigger attempt liability (although, for now we
will also assume that aside from the inchoate liability, these
planning costs are $0). The underlying offense will produce an
immediate benefit, at time 2, of either $100 or $200, each with a
likelihood of 0.5. The offenders will know right before the crime
the actual benefit from the underlying offense. The inchoate of-
fense has delayed expected sanctions, in period 3, of $5, while the
underlying offense, has delayed expected sanctions, also in period
3 of $170. The TC offender will make a long-term decision to in-
vest in the inchoate offense since it would provide her with a 'real
option.' It will put her in a position to commit the underlying of-
fense in period 2 if it turns out that the benefits are $200. Since
she has perfect self-control, she will decide to obey the law if the
benefits are only $100. On the other hand, the sophisticated TI
offender knows that if he invests in the inchoate offense option at
time 1, he will commit the underlying offense in both states of the
world. In other words, he knows that given his immediacy multi-
plier of 2, he will perceive the immediate benefits of $100 as $200,
which is greater than the delayed sanctions. As a result, the so-
phisticated TI offender will not invest in the inchoate offense and,
since the inchoate offense is a necessary condition for the under-
lying offense, he will not commit the underlying offense in period
2, even if the benefits are $200.
As can be seen from this example, even a relatively small in-
choate liability can act as a state-provided commitment device for
sophisticated TI offenders. If, on the other hand, the TI offender
is naive, he will believe incorrectly that he will act in a TC man-
ner in period 2 and will commit the underlying offense only if the
benefits are $200. However, given the TI offender's immediacy
multiplier of 2, he will commit the crime in both states of the
world and, thus, will engage in TI misconduct when the benefits
are only $100. But let us enrich this example by assuming that at
the time of triggering the inchoate liability the offender has to ex-
ert additional effort to avoid detection for the inchoate offense.
128. See supra Section II.E (discussing the difference between sophisticated and naive
offenders).
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Assume that an offender has to invest an additional $5, incurred
immediately, in period 1, in order to avoid detection. For example,
the inchoate offense may involve soliciting a third party to pur-
chase a gun to commit the crime, and the offender has to incur an
immediate expense of $5 to assure that the third party is not an
undercover law enforcement agent. The TC offender will incur the
additional $5, since even at $10, the inchoate offense option has
positive value. On the other hand, the naive TI offender will
make a long-term decision in period 0 to invest in the inchoate of-
fense option in period 1, but when period 1 arrives, he will have
an incentive to procrastinate making the $5 precautionary in-
vestment. Since he is naive, he will believe incorrectly that if he
procrastinates making the investment, he will do so in the future.
But given his naivet6, he will have an incentive to repeatedly pro-
crastinate. As a result, he will never invest in the inchoate of-
fense option and will never commit the underlying offense.
As can be seen, the very fact that inchoate offenses make the
underlying crime more complex and create additional immediate
expenses for offenders can turn them into effective commitment
devices for naive and sophisticated TI offenders. Moreover, be-
cause inchoate offenses can impose immediate costs (in addition
to the delayed sanctions), but will never produce immediate bene-
fits, they can lead TI offenders to procrastinate making the in-
vestment, but will never lead them to engage in TI misconduct.
As a result, in order to act as an effective commitment device for
sophisticated TI offenders, the delayed sanctions for the inchoate
offense can be much lower than the expected sanctions for the
underlying offense. And in order to act as a commitment device
for a naive TI offender, the inchoate offense sanctions can again
be relatively low, but the commission of the inchoate offense must
impose some sort of immediate cost on the offender-such as the
precautionary investments discussed above." 9
129. Professor Richard McAdams has recently argued that the potential for an early
arrest (before the offender can complete the underlying offense) will have a disproportion-
ate impact on TI offenders. See Richard McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1607, 1618-19 (2011) (arguing that inchoate crimes can have a dispropor-
tionate effect on TI offenders due to the immediate disutility from an early arrest). TC and
TI offenders who believe that they may be arrested for an inchoate offense before they
have completed the underlying offense will react in the same manner: Both face an ex-
pected sanction from the inchoate offense, and neither will receive any proceeds from the
underlying offense, and thus they will obey the law when the expected sanctions from the
inchoate offense and the underlying offense are greater than the expected benefits from
the underlying offense. One possible way to interpret Professor McAdams' argument is the
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This is an important result because it provides a justification
for using inchoate liability instead of increasing the delayed sanc-
tions for the underlying crime. It also helps explain the practice of
punishing them less harshly than the underlying crime.13°
D. The Projection Bias and Inchoate Crimes
Under the projection bias explanation of criminal misconduct,
an offender commits a crime because he fails to fully account the
extent to which his prediction of his future tastes-and thus his
future utility-is being distorted by his current tastes. For exam-
ple, an offender who is in a hot psychological state may commit a
crime that he would not have were he able to predict with suffi-
cient accuracy how he will feel after the fact, when he is back in a
cold psychological state. The key is that even an offender who
knows that he will feel differently, after the fact, may nonetheless
mispredict the full extent of the distortion caused by the projec-
tion bias. An offender in the heat of passion may lose all ability
to make rational decisions, but the more interesting cases involve
offenders who know that they are in a hot psychological state that
is distorting their cost-benefit analysis but who still commit the
crime because of their misprediction. In a second type of case, an
offender knows that he will feel a strong disutility if he is caught
and prosecuted, but due to the projection bias, he mispredicts the
full extent of that disutility. This again can lead an offender to
commit a crime when he would have obeyed the law if he were
not subject to the projection bias. What is the relationship be-
tween inchoate offenses and the projection bias?
An offender who commits a crime due to the projection bias
makes a rationality mistake and thus suffers a welfare loss; at
least if one adopts the plausible assumption that offenders are
more likely to succeed in committing crimes if they are able to ac-
curately predict how their tastes may change over time, and if
following: Inchoate crimes (and underlying offenses), increase the anxiety of TI offenders
by increasing the likelihood of an arrest (since an offender is now subject to arrest for ei-
ther the inchoate crime or the underlying offense); this anxiety imposes an immediate dis-
utility on TI offenders, and thus makes it more likely that they will engage in TI obedi-
ence. See Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent
Misconduct, 44 Hous. L. REV. 609, 666-67 (2007) (arguing that the immediate disutility
from anxiety can lead to TI obedience).
130. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 11.5(c), at 251-52 (discussing lower sanctions for
attempts).
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they are able to plan, execute, and cover up their criminal activi-
ties while in a cold, non-distorted psychological state. Under this
assumption, a rational offender would have a long-term prefer-
ence to make decisions about potential misconduct that are based
on accurate intertemporal predictions about their future tastes
and utility. Suppose that the expected sanctions from the under-
lying offense will provide an offender a disutility of 150 and that
the benefits would provide him a utility of 100. Suppose further
that due to the projection bias the offender predicts incorrectly
that the disutility from being apprehended and punished is less
than 100. He would then commit the underlying offense and suf-
fer an expected welfare loss of 50 utils. However, suppose that the
offender triggers inchoate liability, and the expected sanctions
from the inchoate offense will provide him with a disutility of less
than 50 utils, then the existence of an inchoate offense will in-
crease the offender's overall welfare. In other words, he is better
off if he is apprehended before he completes the underlying of-
fense, or even better, if he is able to renounce his plan and escape
liability altogether. This helps explain both the existence of in-
choate offenses and why they are punished less harshly than the
underlying offense. It also helps explain two other features of in-
choate offenses: (1) why offenders are sometimes able to escape
liability even after they have triggered inchoate liability and (2)
why inchoate offenses often require some salient act in further-
ance of the plan to commit the underlying offense-a person in a
hot psychological state may start with evil thoughts and internal
plans to commit a crime but may have time to cool-off before fol-
lowing through with the more salient, externalized behavior that
would trigger liability.
As I argued above, the types of crimes that are most likely to
trigger inchoate liability are those that are complex enough that
they cannot be completed on-the-spot. A person in a hot psycho-
logical state is most likely to succumb to on-the-spot crimes or to
crimes that require planning but which the individual executes
immediately because he believes incorrectly that it does not re-
quire planning or mispredicts how he will feel after the fact if he
follows through without planning and is caught or he fails to exe-
cute it correctly. All other things being equal, an offender is more
likely to carry out the underlying offense successfully if he is in a
cold psychological state; he is less likely to rush the crime or to
miss one or more steps necessary for executing it correctly. An in-
dividual who receives inside information indicating that the value
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of his stock-holdings are about to decline precipitously may en-
gage in illegal insider trading without giving sufficient thought to
the consequences or how to cover-up his tracks. Aiming a gun
while in a hot psychological state is more likely to lead to misses.
The car thief who comes across an unlocked car or the burglar
who comes across an open window may be led to commit crimes of
opportunity that are more likely to be unsuccessful than if he had
waited, reconnoitered, planned, and coolly executed his crime.
How does one deter this type of offender? In the end, it may be
impossible, other than to make them liable both for their success-
ful and unsuccessful attempts to commit the underlying offense.
One can make a plausible argument that these types of criminals
are more dangerous than cool-headed, calculating ones because
they are more difficult to deter and because poorly executed
crimes can harm not just the intended victim but third parties:
The opportunistic car thief may end up in a car chase that harms
third parties; and the opportunistic burglar may discover that an
apparently vacant home is in fact inhabited. But even if this were
not the case, one would expect that the potential penalty for a
failed attempt will help deter criminals whose projection bias is
smaller-those who are better able to predict their future prefer-
ences and not to yield to the pull of hot psychological states.
These offenders will spend more time planning their crimes and
choosing the optimal time to execute them. This, of course, will
lead to a higher success rate vis-A-vis the underlying offense, but
it will also increase the likelihood that they will trigger inchoate
liability along the way. A fully rational offender will take both of
these facts into account and may decide not to commit crimes that
require extensive planning or the assistance of others. The exist-
ence of this trade-off between the higher probability of success of
the underlying offense and the higher probability of inchoate lia-
bility again helps explain both why inchoate offenses exist and
why they are punished less harshly. The claim is not that an of-
fender is more likely to change his mind after he has triggered an
inchoate offense but, rather, that a fully rational offender may
choose to concentrate on crimes that are less susceptible to trig-
gering inchoate liability.
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E. Limitations and Potential Objections
The behavioral theory of criminal misconduct developed in Sec-
tion II and the new explanations of inchoate offenses developed in
this Section are not meant to provide a complete and final expla-
nation of what motivates offenders to commit crimes or to explain
every puzzle and doctrinal wrinkle of inchoate offenses. The goal
instead is to supplement the standard law and economic account
of criminal misconduct; it does so by providing a theoretical
framework that incorporates into the standard account, in a min-
imalist fashion, the growing empirical evidence on the systematic
inattention of decision-makers, TI preferences, and the projection
bias. I use this behavioral framework to provide a positive ac-
count of inchoate offenses. But the account is limited by the very
fact that it is based on a behavioral framework that is by nature
incomplete.
A reasonable person may raise the following objection: Given
the behavioral economics evidence, it is either impossible (or ill-
advised) to try to supplement the standard account. We should ei-
ther replace it altogether with a full-fledged theory or leave the
standard model as is: simple, easy to understand, and easy to ap-
ply.
The standard model assumes that offenders are perfectly ra-
tional. Even if this assumption makes sense in other areas of
human endeavors, it is one that is particularly ill-suited to the
area of criminal misconduct. The behavioral approach developed
in Section II at least has the advantage of providing an account of
offenders that is more in keeping with the type of offenders found
in the empirical and theoretical criminology literature."' Moreo-
ver, even if, on average, criminals come relatively close to acting
in a perfectly rational manner, it still makes sense to examine the
extent to which well-documented rationality shortcomings can
131. For example, the criminology literature has given a large amount of attention to
the extent to which individuals commit crimes due to self-control problems. See, e.g.,
GoTTrFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 99, at 232 ("[Self-control problems are,] for all in-
tents and purposes, the individual-level cause of crime."); Travis C. Pratt & Francis T.
Cullen, The Empirical Status of Gottfredson and Hirschi's General Theory of Crime: A Me-
ta-Analysis, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 931, 951-52 (2000) (undertaking a meta-analysis and review
of empirical literature on self-control theory and finding that the principal predictor of dif-
ference between offenders and nonoffenders is their level of awareness of future conse-
quences of their misconduct); Wilson & Abrahamse, supra note 33, at 372-74 (discussing
the role of self-control problems of criminal activity).
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have systematic effects on criminal behavior. If the ultimate goal
is to maximize aggregate social welfare, it is necessary to look at
aggregate effects. If a sufficiently large number of offenders
makes a small rationality mistake, the aggregate effect can be
large; if a small number of offenders repeatedly make small or
large rationality mistakes, the effect on total social welfare can
also be large. The goal of this article, however, is not to provide a
full behavioral law and economics analysis of criminal misconduct
but, instead, to explain the existence of inchoate crimes and the
practice of punishing them with lower sanctions than those for
the underlying offense in a world in which offenders are not fully
rational.
At the same time, even if some offenders are not perfectly ra-
tional, a model that posits offenders are rational will provide a
good baseline to identify the extent to which, in the real world, of-
fenders fail to act rationally.'32 Moreover, even if a theory with
perfectly rational offenders fails to provide an accurate positive
account, it is still helpful as a normative account of how offenders
would want to act. A theory that posits offenders are rational
when they commit crimes would find little difficulty in adding the
additional assumption that rational offenders have a second-
order preference to act rationally. Put slightly differently, ration-
al offenders want to act rationally; they may, on occasion, fail to
do so, but from a detached perspective-when deliberating about
how they would want to act when faced with an opportunity to
commit a crime-they want their future selves to act perfectly ra-
tionally and commit crimes only when doing so would maximize
their overall utility. Each time an offender fails to adhere to this
second-order preference, he incurs a welfare loss, measured as
the difference between the utility if he had acted in a perfectly ra-
tional manner and the utility that he actually received, due to his
less-than-fully-rational behavior. Since the standard economic ac-
count includes an offender's utility in the social welfare calculus,
132. Such an approach can help lawmakers design legal rules that are tailored to real
world contexts. For example, the Coase Theorem assumes that parties can reallocate enti-
tlements through bargains that they can carry out without the impediments of transaction
costs. This zero transaction costs assumption acts as a good baseline for designing legal
rules that take into account the transaction costs faced by parties, including finding ways
of creating rules that reduce transaction costs and thus help eliminate obstacles to achiev-
ing Coasean bargains. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17
(1982) (discussing bargaining breakdowns due to distributional constraints and other
transaction costs, which can lead to a failure of the Coase Theorem to apply).
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it would have to include the welfare losses incurred by an offend-
er due to failing to adhere to his second-order preference to act in
a fully rational manner. Nonetheless, as this article shows, there
are three types of rationality shortcomings that can materially af-
fect the decision-making process of offenders, leading them to vio-
late the law in instances in which the fully rational actors posited
by the standard account would have obeyed the law.
One can also reasonably object to the account of inchoate of-
fenses developed in this Section, since it is set forth at a high lev-
el of generality and does not attempt to provide concrete answers
to every possible doctrinal wrinkle. But my goal is limited to
providing an account of why inchoate offenses exist and why they
are punished less harshly than the underlying offense. These are
the two general issues that provide a general difficulty both for
the consequentialist and the retributivist. The account that I pro-
vide has the advantage of trying to justify inchoate offenses from
the perspective of both society and offenders. Offenders, behind a
veil of ignorance, who are unsure of whether they will turn out to
be the perfectly rational animal of the economics literature or the
homo economicus of the behavioral literature would favor a sys-
tem of criminal law that includes inchoate offenses and that at-
taches to these sanctions less severely than those for the underly-
ing offense. This is because offenders who turn out to be perfectly
rational will not be unduly prejudiced by the existence of inchoate
liability-they will incorporate them correctly into their overall
cost-benefit analysis; however, offenders who turn out to have TI
preferences or are subject to the projection bias would benefit
from the commitment aspects inherent in inchoate offenses. Fi-
nally, the general framework developed in this article can be easi-
ly applied to explain a number of doctrinal aspects of inchoate of-
fenses, including the importance of requiring some sort of
behavior in furtherance of the underlying offense and the fact
that, unlike other crimes, inchoate offenses can be sometimes un-
done if they are properly renounced. But these issues are beyond
the scope of the current article.
CONCLUSION
Both retributivist and consequentialist-based theories of crimi-
nal punishment find it difficult to explain why inchoate crimes,
such as attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation, exist. The goal of
this article is to provide a deeper understanding of inchoate of-
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fenses by taking into account three types of rationality shortcom-
ings: bounded rationality/inattention, TI preferences, and the pro-
jection bias. By analyzing the interaction between inchoate of-
fenses and these rationality shortcomings, I have identified a set
of new explanations for why inchoate crimes exist and why they
are punished less harshly than the underlying offense. The be-
havioral theory of criminal misconduct developed in Section II by
itself provides us with a better understanding of why offenders
often commit crimes that in hindsight-or from the perspective of
objective third parties-do not make perfect sense; in other
words, crimes that do not appear to be of the type that are most
likely to maximize the offender's utility. Of course, whenever one
starts relaxing the full rationality assumption of the standard
economic account, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the
proper baseline by which to judge whether actors are behaving
rationally or are engaged in behavior that will, in the long-run,
make them worse off. This article has provided an intuitive ac-
count of how to set this baseline, assuming that offenders want to
behave in the manner predicted by the standard economic ac-
count-that they want to give full attention and incorporate into
their decision-making process all relevant information, that they
want to avoid reversing their long-term preferences when they
are faced with the prospect of immediate gratification, and that
they want to accurately predict the extent to which their tastes
and preferences may change over time.
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